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THE AMERICAN DREAM, DEFERRED: CONTEXTUALIZING 
PROPERTY AFTER THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
PRIYA S. GUPTA
*
 
ABSTRACT 
 In a few short years, the American Dream has dried up like a 
raisin in the sun.  Massive foreclosures of the mid-to-late 2000s 
have left the status of the American Dream of homeownership in 
serious question.  In this paper, I argue that in order to formulate 
new federal housing and homeownership policy goals, the under-
lying vision of property rights that informs such policy needs to 
be examined and re-oriented to one that recognizes the nature of 
property (specifically with regards to residences) as an intercon-
nected and contextualized regime. 
 In the decades following World War II, the federal government 
supported homeownership and egalitarian access to such owner-
ship through legal regimes and rhetoric.  The form this promotion 
took—the push for detached single-family houses—maps a model 
of property rights that values ownership, separation, autonomy, 
and a particular legitimate version of the “home.”  Despite this 
promotion, just before and during the Foreclosure Crisis of the 
mid-2000s, the federal government surprisingly abandoned this 
rhetoric and paradigm by moving towards a different model of 
property rights that treated the house as a commodity, evaluated 
like an investment and bound by the four corners of its mortgage 
contract.  From this model, it could comfortably limit people’s 
rights to their homes, especially for the ‘irresponsible borrowers’ 
amongst them.  The use of both of these models has shifted the 
operation of property as a regime in the United States, and, as I 
argue, not for the better. 
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 After setting out this narrative, I argue for widening the context 
in which property rights, and therefore housing policy, are ana-
lyzed.  I do not craft an entire alternate model of a property re-
gime, but rather offer two perspectives that should, in part, con-
stitute such a model (or models).  In formulating these 
perspectives, I draw examples from the City of Baltimore to argue 
that property and housing policy should recognize (1) the inter-
connectedness of property as an institution and (2) the im-
portance of the context in which the investment and contract sur-
rounding a house were made. 
INTRODUCTION 
 To give every American a stake in the promise and future of our 
country, we will bring the highest standards to our schools and 
build an ownership society.  We will widen the ownership of 
homes and businesses, retirement savings and health insurance 
preparing our people for the challenges of life in a free society.  
President George W. Bush, January 20, 2005
1
 
 
 Wells Fargo, Ms. Jacobson said in an interview, saw the black 
community as fertile ground for subprime mortgages, as working-
class blacks were hungry to be a part of the nation’s home-
owning mania.  Loan officers, she said, pushed customers who 
could have qualified for prime loans into subprime mortgages.  
Another loan officer stated in an affidavit filed last week that em-
ployees had referred to blacks as “mud people” and to subprime 
lending as “ghetto loans.”  New York Times, quoting former 
Wells Fargo employees, June 6, 2009
2
 
 
In a few short years, the American Dream has dried up like a raisin in 
the sun.  One might have thought, based on the explicit government com-
mitment to homeownership throughout the decades following World War 
II, that in the midst of the Foreclosure Crisis of the mid-to-late 2000s, fed-
eral government lawmakers would have acted to provide support for home-
owners and for the very policies they had advanced.
3
  However, they did 
                                                          
 1.  George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/20/politics/20BUSH-TEXT.html. 
 2.  Michael Powell, Bank Accused of Pushing Mortgage Deals on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 
6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/us/07baltimore.html?pagewanted=all.  
 3.  In this Article, I focus on the federal government, primarily the executive and legislative 
branches.  Though the state, municipality, and individual levels of involvement in law and policy 
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not.  This Article explores one aspect of this handling of the Crisis: the slow 
shifts in the nature of property (specifically in residences) as conceived and 
enacted by the federal government. 
I argue that the federal government chose to treat houses primarily as 
investments codified in contracts,
4
 which meant that the massive foreclo-
sures were a result of bad investments that were entered into through private 
contracts (mortgages).  Through this analysis, the nature of the house as a 
“home,” as well as the government’s decades-long role in enabling house 
purchases, were left out of the discourse.  People’s rights to their homes 
could be comfortably limited, especially for the irresponsible investors and 
poor negotiators. 
This model resulted in a narrow conception of potential solutions, 
which primarily focused on so-called “systemic” and financial market sup-
port as opposed to reforms that would have helped home-buyers more di-
rectly.  Now, faced with the aftermath of that choice—namely, having pur-
portedly saved the banks and the “financial system”—the way forward for 
housing policy or foreclosures is unclear.
5
 
In order to craft a workable housing policy, we must have in mind a 
vision of the kind of property regime
6
 around which we want society to be 
structured.
7
  The power of a property regime to create social order and jus-
tice has been recognized by many scholars,
8
 and the desirability of deliber-
                                                          
relating to the Foreclosure Crisis are also fascinating, they are outside the scope of this Article, 
except through case study and examples in Parts III and IV.  
 4.  It is not that this investment-based model was completely new, but that the extreme form 
it took was, as further explained in Part II.    
 5.  See Neil Barofsky, Foreclosure Crisis Lessons Not Yet Learned, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Oct. 5, 2011, 11:13 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/neil-barofsky/foreclosures-mortgage-
crisis-_b_995922.html?view=print&comm_ref=false (criticizing the government’s initial response 
to the housing crisis and suggesting strategies to fix “government-sponsored programs”). 
 6.  I am using “regime” in the way that A.J. van der Walt and Eduardo Peñalver do.  See A.J. 
VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS 20 (2009) (explaining that “social, economic and 
political factors help shape regimes . . . [and] are therefore fundamentally political in nature”); 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Reconstructing Richard Epstein, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 429, 434 
(2006) (“In contrast [to a specific government practice or policy], a regime is an entire complex of 
interlocking practices that constitute the permissible operations of the state.”). 
 7.  See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 4 (1999) (stating that 
“[p]roperty was central to [the Founders’] plan of social stability”); Joseph William Singer, How 
Property Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership 6 (Harv. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 
08-06, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093341 (stating 
that “property norms shape our understanding of the meaning of property rights and the legitimate 
contours of social relationships”).  
 8.  See infra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
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ately crafting a property regime to “enable the have-nots to become haves”9 
has been expressed by Progressive Property theorists in particular.
10
 
In the context of post-colonial South Africa, A.J. van der Walt’s pro-
ject entails “imagin[ing] alternative outcomes” with regard to legal reform, 
through an approach that focuses on “marginal persons and groups (in the 
form of those who suffered under the injustices of the discredited regime or 
whose position must be taken seriously because of the political changes).”11  
This approach is particularly appropriate for modern housing policy in the 
United States, given that low-income and minority populations were signif-
icantly targeted by housing policy in the last few decades and, therefore, 
most affected by the Foreclosure Crisis.  A.J. van der Walt goes on to state 
that this approach attempts to “consider property from this marginal per-
spective and to develop the implications of such a perspective for property 
theory in general” and “reflect on thinking about property, particularly 
thinking about the nature and function of change in property regimes,”12 
methods which I attempt to emulate with this project as well. 
This Article endeavors to address this challenge by linking models of 
property regimes to housing policy in the United States before, during, and 
after the Foreclosure Crisis.
13
  While I do not attempt to articulate an entire 
                                                          
 9.  Joseph Singer, After the Flood: Equality & Humanity in Property Regimes, 52 LOY. L. 
REV. 243, 264 (2006); see also id. at 281 (explaining that “[t]he pragmatic view . . . rests on the 
notion that society (acting through governmental, as well as nongovernmental, institutions) has 
obligations to act to improve things for the least fortunate and not to rest until that is done”).  
 10.  Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
743, 744 (2009) (stating that “[p]roperty law should establish the framework for a kind of social 
life appropriate to a free and democratic society”).  While considering how the U.S. property re-
gime and housing policy could be reframed to benefit those currently left out or marginalized by 
them, I also draw from A.J. van der Walt’s situating of property as a social institution in transfor-
mational settings: “Acknowledging the social origins and nature of property also implies that so-
cial injustice affects and shapes the property regime; conversely, recognition of the need for social 
reform implies acceptance of the justification for reform of the property regime, whether it be on a 
smaller or larger scale.”  VAN DER WALT, supra note 6, at 21.  While van der Walt was referring 
to South Africa in particular and calling for a complete reformation of that property regime, his 
mode of analysis offers insight into how more progressive and creative ideas in policy and law can 
be encouraged with respect to property generally.  I believe that this level of social commitment 
and creativity is very much needed to manage the Crisis and policy posed by the Foreclosure Cri-
sis. 
 11.  VAN DER WALT, supra note 6, at 17–21.  
 12.  Id. at 21.  Please note that this Article takes a similar perspective by looking at primarily 
low income people affected by foreclosure of their primary residence.  I do not directly address 
foreclosures on second houses, vacation homes, and other purchases of non-primary residential 
properties.  
 13.  As Nestor M. Davidson and Rashmi Dyal-Chand observe: “Because the current econom-
ic crisis started in the housing market and because the response has sparked primal concerns about 
how the government is reshaping the nature of ownership, it is a crisis even more deeply grounded 
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alternate model of property, I do submit this project in hope of encouraging 
a rethinking of how property can be crafted in order to offer more creative, 
flexible ideas regarding housing policy.  To do this, I use a case study of 
Baltimore as a starting point to explore alternative visions of both property 
and housing policy that more accurately reflect how property works as a re-
gime (and not just as an individual entitlement).
14
 
The alternative approaches to property that emerge from this analysis 
offer two modes of analyzing property: the first draws from what Joseph 
Singer (borrowing from Martha Minow) has referred to as the “connected-
ness” of property regimes;15 and the second is what I refer to as the “con-
text” of homeownership.16  From these perspectives of property, I offer sev-
eral speculations on ways to advance housing policy that are based on a 
more flexible idea of ownership.
17
 
Much has been written on individual judicial decisions and the actual 
laws and legislative acts passed in response to the Foreclosure Crisis, as 
well as on the inadequate regulation prior to it.
18
  With this Article, I want 
to take a step back and examine: (1) how the federal government shifted the 
terms of the choices it faced in housing policy during the Crisis by adopting 
                                                          
in and evocative of property.”  Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1610 (2010).  Their project, focusing on the alternate models of property 
norms that inform the regulatory response with regard to the homeowners and the financial institu-
tions, is discussed in Part III of this Article.  While both of our projects set out to link how ideas of 
property drive regulatory responses, their project focuses on regulation of homeowners as con-
trasted with financial institutions that emerged during the financial crisis, and my Article focuses 
on a historical narrative of housing policy before, during, and now after the Foreclosure Crisis.  
See id. at 1611–12. 
 14.  See infra Part III. 
 15.  See Singer, supra note 9, at 336 (arguing that “property and sovereignty are interconnect-
ed and that property cannot exist without government”); see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL 
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 110 (1991) (explaining that a 
“social-relations approach” to legal relationships between people “assumes that there is a basic 
connectedness between people, instead of assuming that autonomy is the prior and essential di-
mension of personhood”). 
 16.  See infra Part III. 
 17.  See infra Part III. 
 18.  See, e.g., Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime 
and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 727, 732–35 (2009) (discussing a series of eco-
nomic, administrative, and practical factors that ought to be considered in any prospective solution 
to the Foreclosure Crisis); Chunlin Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening 
the Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 621, 622–26 (2011) (arguing that contract law facilitat-
ed the subprime mortgage crisis by prioritizing the self-interest of involved parties and creating a 
business culture with a “‘moral deficit’”); Alan M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime Mort-
gages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 619 (2008) (analyzing the key factors, including inadequate regu-
lation, that contributed to “such an obviously flawed lending model” and subsequent subprime 
mortgage crisis).  
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a commodity-based model of property rights; (2) what problems exist with 
using this version of property; and (3) how this moment can be used to re-
orient property and housing in terms that more accurately represent how 
property works and that encourage innovative solutions to the current prob-
lems in housing policy. 
Part I of this Article will explore the federal government’s commit-
ment to an “Ownership Society,” and the underlying vision of property law 
that informed it —the “[C]astle [M]odel.”19  While the idea of the home as a 
castle had existed for centuries,
20
 the federal government’s material support 
and rhetorical dissemination of this ideal in the mid-twentieth century ena-
bled homeownership of a certain kind of house to be deeply embedded in 
the American psyche.  In the 1990s, the goal of homeownership was ex-
panded from not only castles, but as I argue, castles for everyone—
especially for minorities and poor people.
21
  The move toward egalitarian 
access involved selling the same physical dream of the castle, but with pur-
ported significant investment benefits meant to come from homeownership.  
Primarily, this meant expansive rhetoric and policies that treated the house 
as a secure and responsible investment and a way for minorities to be in-
cluded in American society.  While the house had been seen as an invest-
ment before, this version of the model took the investment qualities of the 
house to an extreme.
22
 
Part II will argue that before and during the Foreclosure Crisis the 
government increasingly treated houses as commodities—judged by in-
vestment criteria bound by contractual terms.
23
  During the Crisis, this 
“Commodity Model” was used to limit homeowners’ rights to their homes 
(investments) by the sanctity of contract with their banks and the strength of 
their investment (if they had invested wisely, they would not be facing fore-
                                                          
 19.  Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, In-
vestments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 314–15 (2006).  My use of the 
“Castle Model” and the “Commodity Model” terminology is to illustrate the divergent visions that 
have informed property and housing.  I am not arguing that these were the only models that exist-
ed, or even that they are discrete, easily defined models with internal consistency; rather, they are 
ways of seeing the values and choices that have played dominant roles in constructing property 
and housing policies.  
 20.  See id. at 314–15 (explaining that “[t]he most common image of property is the castle,” 
which is an “idea [] deeply embedded in our consciousness”). 
 21.  See infra Part I. 
 22.  See infra Part II; see also Building Castles of Sand, ECONOMIST (Apr. 16, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/13492469 (asserting that government support for homeowner-
ship swelled pricing in the market, which subsequently “exaggerated the consumer boom while it 
lasted, and amplified the bust when that came”). 
 23.  See infra Part II. 
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closure).
24
  This model advanced certain problematic versions of property 
rights in houses: it treated them as fungible investments; it evaluated their 
worth based on investment criteria, such as market value; and it furthered 
an extreme form of contract law rhetoric that elevated efficiency, liberty, 
and private nature beyond their practical limit, to the detriment of the actual 
property attached to those contracts.
25
 
In an attempt to move away from this system of property, Part III of-
fers several values which begin to constitute an alternative model that rec-
ognizes the interconnectedness of property and the importance of the con-
text in which investments and contracts were made, as informed by 
examples from Baltimore.
26
  An “interconnected” vision of property in-
cludes actors other than the single buyer (borrower) and lender, and it con-
siders the costs and effects of their relationship on the community, the mu-
nicipality, the physical property itself, and other taxpayers.
27
  It also 
recognizes that these various actors are both affected by and have an effect 
upon property buyers and lenders.  A “contextual” inquiry into the invest-
ment aspects of homeownership explores what prompted homebuyers to en-
ter into such investments, what information was available, what incentives 
were offered and by whom, who benefited from these investments, and how 
they benefited.  A contextual inquiry into the mortgage contract goes be-
yond what is written or whom the two parties are, and it takes into consid-
eration how such contracts came about, the choices and information availa-
ble at the time they were made, relative bargaining power, and importantly, 
how the fact that these contracts are often tied to non-fungible forms of 
property (homes) for many of the parties impacts the nature of the bargain.
28
 
Finally, in Part IV, I will offer several initial speculations as to how a 
property regime based on these modes of analysis might translate into hous-
ing policy, again drawing on examples currently at work in several munici-
palities in the United States.
29
 
                                                          
 24.  This was done through law, regulation (both adopted and not adopted), and rhetoric, as 
further explained in Part II.  
 25.  See infra Part I. 
 26.  See infra Part III. 
 27.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 28.  See infra Part III.B. 
 29.  See infra Part IV. 
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I.  CASTLES IN HOUSING POLICY AND PROPERTY LAW PRIOR TO THE 
FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
Federal housing policy after World War II promoted individual family 
homeownership in ways that set the stage for the Foreclosure Crisis to 
come.  Through a variety of policy mechanisms described below, the feder-
al government aimed to jumpstart the struggling economy with the promo-
tion of homeownership after World War II.
30
  Later, in the 1990s and 2000s, 
this vision was expanded to include low-income and minority families in 
the so-called “American Dream.”31  This background provides a clearer pic-
ture of how the Foreclosure Crisis eventually arose and why the eventual 
policy responses to it were so destructive. 
These two promotions—homeownership as the primary means of 
housing and acceptance of low-income and minority families into American 
society through expanded lending and homeownership—also sold two par-
ticular visions of law: absolute ownership over one’s property and purport-
edly socially inclusive housing policy based on a particular vision of the le-
gitimate (owned) “home.”  Below, I argue that these two prongs of the 
housing policy proved untenable during the Foreclosure Crisis but have 
nevertheless found their way into a profound place in American society and 
cannot be completely abandoned.
32
 
A.  The “Castle Model” of Property Rights 
The idea of one’s house as one’s castle goes back centuries and is 
deeply embedded in property law and theory.  From Sir Edward Coke’s 
                                                          
 30.  Unfortunately, a full discussion of why they promoted this kind of homeownership is be-
yond the scope of this Article.  Factors included a desire to stimulate the economy after World 
War II, the convergence of technology (including the automobile) and consumerism, strong lobby-
ing from home building and real estate development firms, and fear of communism (as communal 
living appeared to promote).  For a fascinating historical discussion of this, see ROSALYN 
BAXANDALL & ELIZABETH EWEN, PICTURE WINDOWS: HOW THE SUBURBS HAPPENED (2000); 
KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1985); Paul Wiseman, U.S. Economic Recovery Is Weakest Since World War II, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 15, 2012, 11:58 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/15/us-economic-
recovery-weak_n_1783065.html (discussing the ripple effects in the economy of home purchases).  
See also Kristin David Adams, Homeownership: American Dream or Illusion of Empowerment?, 
60 S.C. L. REV. 573, 597 (2009) (stating that “[i]n addition to the private interests [of developers, 
etc.], government officials have long considered boosting homeownership and new construction to 
be a reliable means of boosting a sluggish economy”).  
 31.  See generally DAVID M.P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY & WHITE 
RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (2007) (discussing how federal intervention spurred a 
dramatic shift in residential exclusion). 
 32.  See infra Part I. 
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declaration in 1628 that “a man’s house is his castle”33 to William Black-
stone’s famous description of property as “that sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, 
in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe,”34 
much literature has studied Coke’s and Blackstone’s (in)famous quotes, and 
qualified them with heavy doses of the reality of property.
35
  As such, I will 
not attempt to recreate their arguments here. 
The version of this image that I focus on in this Article is best de-
scribed by Joseph Singer and Joan Williams.  In the context of government 
takings, Singer describes what he calls the “castle model of ownership,” 
which is a model of property valuing dominion over one’s property.36  This 
idea of dominion is multi-faceted and entails “sovereignty, management 
and governance,” along with “‘power absolute within its judicially-
delimited sphere.’”37  According to the “castle model[,] . . . within the bor-
ders of one’s land, the owner is supreme and can do whatever he wishes.”38  
As for operating beyond its borders, “one must obtain the consent of other 
owners to enter their land and have dealings with them.”39 
Another articulation of this model comes from Williams, who adopts 
Thomas Grey’s terminology of the “intuitive image” of property as absolute 
control over things (rather than relationships between people as described 
by many legal scholars).
40
  She acknowledges that this version of absolute 
property rights is distinct from the actual practice of limited ones,
41
 but that 
the rhetoric of absolutism remains a “hardy perennial,” perhaps because the 
rhetoric of property in this absolute form was not meant to define actual 
                                                          
 33.  See Singer, supra note 19, at 309 (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE OF THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 162 (1644)). 
 34.  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.  He is later quoted as saying that “every 
man’s house is looked upon by the law to be his castle.”  5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *235. 
 35.  See, e.g., LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND 
POWER 3 (2003) (exploring “[t]he growing divergence between traditionally protective notions of 
property and the realities of the contemporary regulatory state”); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of 
Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 280–93 (1998) (pointing out that “[m]any commentators have 
noted the gap between the political rhetoric of absolute property rights and the practice of limited 
property rights,” the former of which is embodied by Blackstone); Singer, supra note 19, at 314 
(suggesting a third model of property in addition to Coke’s and Blackstone’s traditional views that 
“has been marginalized and suppressed”).  
 36.  Singer, supra note 19, at 317. 
 37.  Id. at 315 (citation omitted). 
 38.  Id. at 317. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Williams, supra note 35, at 278, 281. 
 41.  Id. at 280–81. 
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practice, but rather to stand “in opposition to the abuses of [excessive gov-
ernment power]” and to be used “whenever the scope of government power 
was at issue.”42 
The power of the rhetorical forces of absolutism is not to be understat-
ed, as it has provided the raw materials for housing policy discourse (and 
therefore law)
43
 for decades and continues to have a strong role in social 
norms regarding property.  According to Williams, the rhetoric and concep-
tion of absolutism in property rights is held by “layfolk and experts alike.”44  
This rhetoric of absolute power over one’s borders feeds directly into the 
idea of the “American Dream,” which is generally acknowledged to mean 
owning one’s “own” home.45  As discussed in this Section, a modern con-
ception of the castle also appears to incorporate the image of a home as a 
haven and safe place for families to flourish.
46
  Even if one does not fully 
achieve complete independence and despotism, or a perfect family life, the 
images of absolute control and the romantic notion of the home have been 
manufactured as values toward which property in practice might work and 
as baselines from which other conceptions can be measured.
47
 
                                                          
 42.  Id. at 282.  
 43.  Id. at 281.  For an insightful analysis as to how rhetoric constitutes law, see James Boyd 
White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 684, 684 (1985) (suggesting that rather than “a system of rules,” law is more so a “branch of 
rhetoric . . . the central art by which community and culture are established, maintained, and trans-
formed”).  
 44.  Williams, supra note 35, at 278.  This is where she differs from Grey, who attempts to 
distinguish between a layfolk conception of absolutism from the specialist one.  Id. at 283–84.  
Williams acknowledges the complexity in both and succeeds in excavating sufficient evidence 
that experts alike are prone to default to the intuitive image.  Id. at 284–93.  As such, I tend to 
agree with Williams on this—while experts may acknowledge the limits of absolutism in law, 
their conceptions do tend to often use the intuitive image as a baseline.  Id. at 293–94.  
 45.  See Wenli Li & Fang Yang, American Dream or American Obsession?  The Economic 
Benefits and Costs of Homeownership, 30 2010 FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA. BUS. REV. 20, 20–21 
(2010) (arguing although homeownership has been “an integral part of the American culture” that 
“it is not for everyone, at least not on economic grounds”), available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-
review/2010/q3/brq310_benefits-and-costs-of-homeownership.pdf.  
 46.  See infra Part I. 
 47.  See Singer, supra note 19, at 311 (“Ownership connotes wealth, power, security, freedom 
from want, and independence . . . .”).  
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B.  Translating the Castle Model into Housing Policy 
1. Building the Myth of “Home” and Ownership After World War 
II 
Castles are alluring.  As is owning a single-family home, a romance 
that was supported by the federal government for decades.
48
  The Castle 
Model was translated into housing policy and manifested in various promo-
tions of single-family suburban house ownership as the legitimate form of 
residence for citizens living the American Dream.
49
  Shifts in housing poli-
cy immediately after World War II effectively redefined the ideal of having 
a residence to owning a castle-like home.
50
 
Prior to World War II, significant obstacles to homeownership existed, 
including large down payments (fifty percent or even higher), high interest 
rates, and short-term mortgages (three to six years).
51
  Homeownership rates 
were limited to around forty percent.
52
  Through a myriad of government 
endeavors meant to jumpstart the economy, including the establishment of 
the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Association (“Freddie Mac”), the Veterans Administration, 
and the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”), government policy mor-
phed the previously restricted mortgage instrument into long-term fixed rate 
                                                          
 48.  See Barbara Kiviat, The Case Against Homeownership, TIME (Sept. 11, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2013850,00.html (“For the better part of a 
century, politics, industry and culture aligned to create a fetish of the idea of buying a house.”); 
Paul Wiseman, Feds Rethink Policies That Encourage Home Ownership, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 
2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2010-08-11-housing11_cv_N.htm (as-
serting that for the past seventy years, “Uncle Sam” has been doing “[w]hatever it takes” to en-
courage homeownership); William M. Rohe et al., The Social Benefits and Costs of Homeowner-
ship: A Critical Assessment of the Research 1 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., 
Working Paper No. LIHO-01.12, 2001), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/liho01-12.pdf (“Living in a single-family, 
owner-occupied dwelling unit is central to the American conception of a secure and successful 
life.”); Li & Yang, supra note 45, at 20 (“Homeownership . . . is an integral part of the American 
culture.”).   
 49.  Thomas J. Sugrue, The New American Dream: Renting, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 
14, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204409904574350432677038184.html 
(“Federal housing policies changed the whole landscape of America, creating the sprawlscapes 
that we now call home . . . .  Of new housing today, 80% is built in suburbs—the direct legacy of 
federal policies that favored outlying areas rather than the rehabilitation of city centers.”).  
 50.  BAXANDALL & EWEN, supra note 30, at 87 (“The power of the [American Dream] was 
so persuasive that a Saturday Evening Post in 1945 revealed that only 14 percent of the population 
would be satisfied to live in an apartment or a ‘used house.’”). 
 51.  See supra notes 48–49. 
 52.  Wiseman, supra note 48. 
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instruments with much lower down payments.
53
  Simultaneously, there was 
the creation of the secondary mortgage market.
54
  These policies meant, as 
the government intended, that more and more Americans, particularly vet-
erans, could take advantage of the apparent benefits of homeownership.
55
  
These policy apparatuses also coincided with the beginning of the rhetoric 
extolling the benefits and American-ness of homeownership that would 
eventually become inextricably ingrained into American society.
56
 
Through the decades, American presidents expounded this vision 
through the programs above as well as through speeches and public state-
ments.  President Herbert Hoover’s statement embodied American con-
sciousness regarding owning a house quite well: “‘The sentiment for home 
ownership is so embedded in the American heart that millions of people 
who dwell in tenements, apartments, and rental rows of solid brick have the 
aspiration for wider opportunity in ownership of their own home.’”57 
Several aspects of this statement are worth noting.  By President Her-
bert Hoover’s account, “dwelling” in an apartment, tenement or rental is 
separate from the idea of one’s “own” home found in the “American 
heart.”58  He also said that ballads about homes “‘were not written about 
tenements or apartments . . . they never sing about a pile of rent receipts.’”59  
In sum, then, having a residence was basically recast as owning one’s own 
home.  Moreover, in President Hoover’s account, even having one’s own 
apartment or sharing a home with others (presumably with other families) 
                                                          
 53.  Id.; Li & Yang, supra note 45, at 21. 
 54.  Though these policies also effectively blurred lines between government and “private” 
promotion, this fact is often lost in current policy debates.  Sugrue discusses the impact of these 
blurred lines: 
Yet the story of how the dream became a reality is not one of independence, self-
sufficiency, and entrepreneurial pluck.  It’s not the story of the inexorable march of the 
free market.  It’s a different kind of American story, of government, financial regula-
tion, and taxation.  We are a nation of homeowners and home-speculators because of 
Uncle Sam. . . .  It’s a story riddled with irony—for at the same time that Uncle Sam 
brought the dream of home ownership to reality—he kept his role mostly hidden, ex-
cept to the army banking, real-estate and construction lobbyists who rose to protect 
their industries’ newfound gains . . . .  Tens of millions of Americans owned their own 
homes because of government programs, but they had no reason to doubt that their 
home ownership was a result of their own virtue and hard work, their own grit and de-
termination—not because they were the beneficiaries of one of the grandest government 
programs ever. 
See Sugrue, supra note 49.  
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 57.  Adams, supra note 30, at 574 (citations omitted).  
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Sugrue, supra note 49. 
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might not meet the high expectations in the American heart.  Indeed, only 
single-family owned houses appeared to constitute homes.  Apartments, 
rentals, and other arrangements have been cut out of legitimacy with two 
interrelated results.  First, “houses” and “homes” are often synonymous in 
American public discourse; and second, this vision of single-family home-
ownership was the form of housing most celebrated as the American Dream 
from approximately this time forward.
60
 
President Hoover also linked aspiration and opportunity with home-
ownership, a theme that carried through the decades.  He is, of course, 
joined by later presidents, across party lines.  For example, President Frank-
lin Roosevelt stated: “‘A nation of homeowners is unconquerable.’”61  Join-
ing the sentiment, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson put 
in place the administrative structures mentioned above (FHA, Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac) that would eventually enable the expansion of homeowner-
ship to low-income and minority populations.
62
 
This sentiment has continued—fast forward to former President Bill 
Clinton’s model of housing policy, explained by his Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”) Secretary, Henry G. Cisneros, as “‘graduat[ing]’” 
the unhoused from shelters to eventual homeownership.
63
  While Secretary 
Cisneros acknowledged that appropriate choices and affordability concerns 
are important, these steps toward homeownership form a clear hierarchy, 
with ownership at the top.
64
 
In the years immediately preceding the Foreclosure Crisis, President 
George W. Bush took the commitment to homeownership to the next level 
in both rhetoric and policy.  President Bush, upon being sworn in a second 
                                                          
 60.  See Henry G. Cisneros, Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., The John T. Dun-
lop Lecture, Homes for Americans in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for the Na-
tion 37 (Sept. 29, 2003), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/m03-2_cisneros.pdf (noting that “[t]he 
final step of the Housing Continuum” is long-term, owner-occupied homeownership). 
 61.  Li & Yang, supra note 45, at 20. 
 62.  See id. at 20 (exploring the effect of cheap credit and insurance guarantees offered by 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA); Wiseman, supra note 48 (reporting that post-World War 
II government push for homeownership came “through Fannie, Freddie, the Veterans Administra-
tion and the Federal Housing Administration”). 
 63.  Cisneros, supra note 60, at 12.  Incidentally, at the time he gave the speech in 2003, Cis-
neros was CEO of American City Vista whose focus “is to build significant numbers of homes . . . 
in central neighborhoods of major metropolitan areas.”  Id. at 5. 
 64.  Id. at 10.  I am not trying to attack all housing policy that promoted homeownership.  I 
am attempting to lay out how these policies were promoted so that their abandonment, as dis-
cussed in Part B, is all the more surprising (and unfair), and the need to rework them, as discussed 
in Part IV, becomes all the more clear.  
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time, noted the government’s commitment to enable citizens to be free of 
government through owning their homes: 
And now we will extend this vision [of a broader definition of 
liberty] by reforming great institutions to serve the needs of our 
time.  To give every American a stake in the promise and future 
of our country, we will bring the highest standards to our schools 
and build an ownership society.  We will widen the ownership of 
homes and businesses, retirement savings and health insurance 
preparing our people for the challenges of life in a free society.  
By making every citizen an agent of his or her own destiny, we 
will give our fellow Americans greater freedom from want and 
fear, and make our society more prosperous and just and equal.
65
 
This rhetoric was backed by policies including down-payment assis-
tance, tax breaks, and other programs to enable more people, especially mi-
norities, to own homes.  In fact, President Bush explicitly encouraged pub-
lic-private partnerships on this front.
66
  And, the private entities embraced 
this ownership rhetoric, as well, until it seemed the entire country had for-
gotten that the American Dream had ever meant anything other than owner-
ship.
67
 
In short, the federal government encouraged homeownership through 
ubiquitous rhetoric
68
 extolling the American-ness of the dream of owner-
                                                          
 65.  See Bush, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
 66.  Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Am.’s Ownership Soc’y: Expanding Oppor-
tunities (Aug. 9, 2004), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-9.html (“President Bush issued Ameri-
ca’s Homeownership Challenge to the real estate and mortgage finance industries to encourage 
them to join the effort to close the gap that exists between the homeownership rates of minorities 
and non-minorities.”). 
 67.  See Angelo R. Mozilo, Chairman, President, & Chief Executive Officer, Countrywide 
Fin. Corp. & Chairman, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Presentation for the Joint Ctr. for Hous. 
Studies of Harvard Univ., The American Dream of Homeownership: From Cliché to Mission 5 
(Feb. 4, 2003), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/m03-
1_mozilo.pdf (describing their mission as “providing more families with the opportunity to realize 
their American Dream by becoming homeowners”); see also Sugrue, supra note 49 (“James 
Truslow Adams, the historian who coined the phrase ‘the American Dream,’ one that he defined 
as ‘a better, richer, and happier life for all our citizens of every rank’ also offered a prescient 
commentary in the midst of the Great Depression.  ‘That dream,’ he wrote in 1933, ‘has always 
meant more than the accumulation of material goods.’  Home should be a place to build a house-
hold . . . .”). 
 68.  See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, THINKING POINTS: COMMUNICATING OUR AMERICAN 
VALUES AND VISION (2006) (discussing the long-term strategy for returning America to its pro-
gressive ideals). See also Let FHA Loans Help You, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., 
http://www.hud.gov/buying/loans.cfm (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).  The Department of Housing 
and Urban Development continues to sell this vision.  Its federal website features a picture of a 
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ship
69
 and supporting that dream through easy credit, which was made pos-
sible through the restructuring of the financial incentives for ownership by 
making it easier to qualify for loans and providing massive subsidies.
70
 
2.  Castles for Everyone 
Homeownership policy at the brink of the Foreclosure Crisis had two 
important prongs—not just castles, but castles for everyone.  From the time 
President Lyndon Johnson initiated low-income homeownership policies 
and expanded federal housing subsidy programs (as part of a response to 
urban riots and racial inequalities),
71
 to the National Homeownership Strat-
egy under President Clinton,
72
 and finally through President George W. 
Bush’s “Ownership Society,”73 the federal government recognized that the 
gap between nonminority and minority ownership needed to be closed.  
President Bush’s plans for the ownership society explicitly celebrated the 
increase in minority ownership during his tenure.
74
  Closing the racial di-
vide of access to property is a laudable goal.  As I explain in Part III, how-
ever, attempting to meet it through a rigid vision of ownership and invest-
ment proved disastrous in the end.
75
 
This promotion of mortgages went further than before and proceeded 
in a way that set the stage for the Foreclosure Crisis (a consequence that had 
                                                          
happy family (a mom, a dad, and their children) with a baseball glove, teddy bear, and a soccer 
ball.  Id. 
 69.  See Sugrue, supra note 49 (“Every generation has offered its own version of the claim 
that owner-occupied homes are the nation’s saving grace.  During the Cold War, home ownership 
was moral armor, protecting America from dangerous outside influences.  ‘No man who owns his 
own house and lot can be a Communist,’ proclaimed builder William Levitt.”). 
 70.  See Michael S. Carliner, Development of Federal Homeownership “Policy,” 9 HOUS. 
POL’Y DEBATE 299, 300 (1998) (stating that “[f]ederal government policy toward housing in gen-
eral, and homeownership in particular, is exercised through three primary mechanisms: tax bene-
fits, regulation of and participation in the financial system, and direct subsidies to housing produc-
ers and consumers”); Building Castles of Sand, supra note 22 (stating “[g]overnments spent a 
fortune encouraging people to buy houses”). 
 71.  George S. Masnick, Home Ownership Trends and Racial Inequality in the United States 
in the 20th Century 6 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W01-4, 
2001), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/masnick_w01-4.pdf.  
 72.  See Adams, supra note 30 at 587 (“The increase in homeownership rates in the U.S. in 
the past several decades has been, at least in part, the product of government initiatives such as the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) National Homeownership Strategy, 
which began in August 1994 under Henry G. Cisneros’s leadership.  The program’s goal was to 
achieve record high homeownership in six years . . . .  As part of this goal, the National Home-
ownership Strategy encouraged ‘creative financing’ as a positive good.” (citations omitted)).  
 73.  Press Release, The White House, supra note 66. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See infra Part III. 
 538 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:523 
 
ruinous effects on the very “social fabric” the federal government purported 
to have strengthened).  The government encouraged and financed lower 
credit standards for loans.  During Clinton’s presidency, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac worked to expand lending to minority and low-income popula-
tions by making lenders report their loans and by guaranteeing subprime 
loans (that is, loans with high interest rates given to riskier borrowers).
76
 
Additionally, the federal government did not regulate its new mortgage in-
struments, namely, adjustable rate mortgages (“ARM”) that had come in re-
sponse to meet the demands for mortgages created by increased capital 
flows into the secondary mortgage market.
77
  The new mortgage instru-
ments had very low initial teaser rates, where borrowers had to pay only in-
terest for the first few years, followed by massive increases in monthly 
payments when the interest rate reset.
78
  Further, these instruments often al-
so required low or no down payments.
79
  The lack of regulation surrounding 
these new instruments was clearly a choice, and by failing to regulate them, 
they grew like weeds.
80
  The government also chose not to regulate the sec-
ondary mortgage market, namely, the increased securitization through col-
lateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) as well as increased exposure to the 
risky underlying mortgages and CDOs through the credit default swaps 
(“CDSs”).81  Finally, the federal government de-regulated (or chose not to 
                                                          
 76.  Thayer Watkins, The Nature and the Origin of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, SAN JOSE 
STATE UNIV. DEP’T OF ECON., http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/subprime.htm (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2011).  But see Jeff Madrick & Frank Partnoy, Why Fannie and Freddie Are Not to 
Blame for the Crisis, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (July 13, 2011, 12:02 PM), 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/jul/13/why-fannie-and-freddie-are-not-blame-
crisis/.  I do not attest that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac caused the Crisis.  I do, however, believe 
that their encouragement and acceptance of subprime loans played a part in structuring the kinds 
of financing that eventually fueled the reckless lending, which then precipitated the Crisis. 
 77.  Brent T. White, Walking Away Scot-Free: Trust, Expert Advice, and Realtor Responsibil-
ity, 40 REAL ESTATE L.J. 312, 322 (2011). 
 78.  Id.  Unfortunately, brokers did not always inform borrowers and/or borrowers failed to 
understand this.  Id. at 318. 
 79.  Id. at 322. 
 80.  Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Prot., Prepared Statement of the Fed. 
Trade Comm’n on Home Equity Lending Abuses in the Subprime Mortgage Industry (Mar. 16, 
1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-
statement-federal-trade-commission-home-equity-lending-abuses-subprime-mortgage-
industry/grass5.pdf.  The government did not pay heed to this 1998 testimony regarding fraud in 
the subprime mortgage industry.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
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regulate) the mortgage industry, specifically the types of banks that could 
offer mortgages and the fee income structure of mortgage brokers.
82
 
C.  How These Polices Map to the Castle Model of Property Rights 
The top of the hierarchy of housing (or, the American Dream)—the 
detached single-family house—maps pretty well to the castle image.  Rather 
than shared equity, rentals, or even apartments, ownership of a detached 
home appears to offer independence, freedom, and all things American, in 
part because it also offers the physicality closest to the romantic version of 
a castle
83
 in modern times.  The suburban home is unattached to neighbors, 
removed from city centers, and is something of which to be proud—a house 
of one’s own where inside, one can do as one likes.84 
The single-family detached unit also appears to offer the clearest form 
of dominion because it has the clearest physical boundaries between it and 
neighboring properties.  From this place, an owner could exercise both 
“dominion” and “sovereignty, management and governance.”85  This unit 
also promotes the romance of the “home”—a place where one has family, 
events, security, health, and even spirituality.
86
  Family, the home, and 
ownership are closely intertwined in this vision: “[t]he American family 
home has played a large role in our social fabric, and the family unit has 
been seen as virtually synonymous with the physical structure of the 
house.”87  Indeed, buying a house has become a symbol and a rite of pas-
                                                          
 82.  Again, I am not trying to blame the government (and implicitly, the bankers).  I am simp-
ly trying to highlight several of the regulatory decisions that lead to the environment in which 
some bankers (and some borrowers) went berserk. 
 83.  As opposed to an actual castle, wherein the ‘owner’ would share space and feudal re-
sponsibilities with and be dependent on the labor of many people to keep it functioning.  
 84.  See Adams, supra note 30, at 595 n.115 (quoting DONALD MACDONALD, DEMOCRATIC 
ARCHITECTURE: PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO TODAY’S HOUSING CRISIS 52 (1996)) (describing 
several practical and psychological reasons for the societal preference for detached housing and 
stating that, “for better or worse the image of the single-family home on its own land is a deeply 
rooted American tradition,” and “[i]n many cases [physical separation from other homes] was a 
decisive selling point”); see also Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of 
Real Property Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 1537 n.55 (2007) (citing CLIFFORD EDWARD CLARK, JR., THE AMERICAN 
FAMILY HOME 1800–1960, 239–41 (1986)) (“chronicling the steadfast importance to Americans 
of owning a single-family dwelling”). 
 85.  Singer, supra note 19, at 315. 
 86.  Cisneros, supra note 60, at 13. 
 87.  Korngold, supra note 84, at 1536.  Korngold further describes the American family 
home: 
[It] remains a foundation of our society: often representing a family’s greatest economic 
investment and asset and providing a source of stability in difficult economic times; 
providing a haven from the hubbub of the outside worlds of work and public affairs, es-
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sage.  With it comes status and an important place in American society.
88
  
Additionally, “[i]n such a context [of so much personal and societal im-
portance placed on the home], enduring racial differences in homeowner-
ship must be taken very seriously.”89  In this march toward the American 
Dream then, the promotion of “castles for everyone” appears to be inevita-
ble. 
The nature of ownership in this story is a cipher, morphing in form but 
not in norm.  Ownership has been the ideal for decades.  Although it was 
not as widespread, it was still highly valued prior to World War II.
90
  In 
more recent times, however, while physically the unit may appear to be 
one’s own castle, financially the modern form is far from autonomous, rely-
ing on borrowed funds from a bank, actual owned percentages (equity) of 
varying amounts, and the specter of foreclosure in the background (until re-
cently when it moved to the foreground).  This change in the financial form 
of ownership does not appear to have tarnished its status as the American 
Dream (although it did affect the reality of these “creative” arrangements 
during the Foreclosure Crisis).  In Parts III and IV, I will return to this idea 
to advocate for another morphing of the form (and this time, the norm) of 
ownership.
91
 
There are tensions even within the Castle Model other than financial 
ones.  For example, there is the reality of limited rights to one’s property 
and the reality of the values that ownership purportedly promotes (values 
such as civic responsibility, security, and participation, to name a few).
92
  
                                                          
pecially in a mobile society; offering opportunities for personal satisfaction through 
self-actualization and family interactions; presenting a forum for the inculcation of val-
ues in children that will support civic discourse and deeds and the realization of person-
al dreams; and allowing an opportunity to create a pleasing aesthetic. 
Id. at 1537. 
 88.  See Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The Mortgage Crisis, 
Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 952 (2008). 
 89.  Masnick, supra note 71, at 8. 
 90.  See Korngold, supra note 84, at 1535 (discussing how land ownership shaped American 
society and that “[b]uying land was an especially important means to improve social status for 
immigrants to the United States”).   
 91.  See infra Parts III–IV. 
 92.  See Building Castles of Sand, supra note 22 (“Governments subsidise home ownership 
because they think it encourages stable, more law-abiding neighborhoods.  The children of home-
owners do better at school than the children of renters do.  Homeowners are more engaged in local 
democracy.  And, because homeowners must pay off their mortgages, housing supposedly encour-
ages people to save more than they otherwise would.”).  For more on this, see LEE ANNE 
FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES (2009). 
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To the extent that these tensions are within the scope of this Article, they 
will be folded into the discussion in Part III.
93
 
II.  THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND AN OLD MODEL OF COMMODIFICATION 
OF HOUSES, REVISED 
Beginning in the mid-2000s, the dream of castles for everyone im-
ploded as many new homeowners found themselves unable to meet mort-
gage payments, many of which had increased due to the reset of their varia-
ble rate mortgages after the initial teaser period.
94
  This led to defaults and a 
decline in the real estate market, a cycle where home values continued to 
fall and houses became harder to sell.
95
  Buyers could not refinance or sell 
their houses to meet their payments.
96
  Lenders foreclosed and faced diffi-
culty when trying to resell.
97
  This situation spread quickly to the financial 
markets through bonds that depended on payment streams from mortgages 
and swaps that insured those bonds.
98
  It is estimated that over four million 
homes have been foreclosed upon since 2007.
99
 
Given the overt governmental furtherance of the egalitarian castle, one 
might have expected some government action to address demands to help 
home buyers, especially as demands came from the same low-income peo-
ple whose homeownership the government had purported to support.
100
  In-
stead, the government abandoned the home rhetoric and treated houses pri-
marily as investments or contracts, as explored below.
101
  Once houses 
                                                          
 93.  See infra Part III. 
 94.  Overall homeownership fell from the peak of ownership at 69% in 2005 to 65.9% in 
2011.  Adams, supra note 30.  Homeownership had not been this low since 1997.  For African 
Americans, homeownership peaked in 2004 at 49.7% and fell in 2011 to 44.2%.  Press Release, 
United States Census Bureau, 2011 Housing Vacancy Survey Annual Statistics (2011), 
http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/annual11/ann11t_22.xls.  For Hispanics, ownership 
peaked in 2005 at 50% and in 2011 had fallen 46.6%.  Id.  African Americans had not had a rate 
that low since 1997, and the same for Hispanics since 1999.  Id.  
 95.  White, supra note 77, at 322.  
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Korngold, supra note 18.  
 98.  White, supra note 77, at 322. 
 99.  Les Christie, Foreclosures Fall to Lowest Level Since 2007, CNN MONEY (Jan. 1, 2012, 
8:18 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/12/real_estate/foreclosures/index.htm.  For an overview 
of the Crisis as it unfolded, see Foreclosed Justice: Causes and Effects of the Foreclosure Crisis 
(Part I & II): Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary H. R., 111th Cong. (2010). 
 100.  Chris Isidore, The Next Bailout: Homeowners, CNN MONEY (Mar. 27, 2008, 6:57 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/26/news/economy/bailout/index.htm (discussing protests and pop-
ulist sentiment regarding the bailout of Bear Stearns and lack of bailout for homeowners, prior to 
TARP). 
 101.  See Sugrue, supra note 49.  
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became investments or contracts, policymakers focused on narrow policy 
solutions flowing from this narrow view of legal choices, forcing a choice 
between banks and homeowners. 
First, this Part constructs the “Commodity Model”102 in order to de-
scribe the vision of property rights that informed how housing was treated 
during the Foreclosure Crisis, as well as to detangle the problems for prop-
erty and housing policy that arise from using this model.
103
  Second, this 
Part then explores how this “Commodity Model” operated to confine poten-
tial causes and solutions, as evidenced by the rhetoric and regulation propa-
gated by lawmakers.  I will argue that this analysis and rhetoric translated 
into a narrow legal framework that barely addressed problems faced by 
homeowners struggling with foreclosure—namely the Trouble Asset Relief 
Program (“TARP”), along with a medley of other acts passed after 2007.  
This Part concludes with a lengthy discussion regarding the problematic 
versions of property rights advanced by this treatment of houses and house-
owners, mortgages, and mortgage holders.
104
 
A.  Treating Houses as Commodities Through Rhetoric and Law 
The “Commodity Model” draws from Singer’s “Investment Model” 
and adds an additional contractual aspect at work during the Foreclosure 
Crisis—namely, the treatment of  houses as investments, as defined by the 
contractual agreements relating to the attached mortgage.
105
  In Singer’s 
Investment Model, a certain form of property is prized above others: prop-
erty as an investment in a market economy with reasonable expectations of 
economic rewards.
106
  Under this model, regulation of property is evaluated 
according to how it accords with the “justified expectations of investors.”107  
A legal analysis using this model tests whether the owner’s expectations 
were “economically justified” and compares those expectations to the regu-
lation in question.
108
 
                                                          
 102.  ALEXANDER, supra note 7.  Alexander also describes a model of property wherein hous-
es are treated as a “commodity,” but his model (to put it crudely) is a rough combination of the 
Castle Model and Commodity Model I describe, supra, in this Article.  Davidson and Dyal-
Chand’s approach is more similar to Alexander’s.  See supra note 13.  For my purposes, I think it 
is helpful to separate how the two models (or parts of the models) came to be prevalent at different 
times, though they both existed concurrently. 
 103.  See infra Part II.A. 
 104.  See infra Part II.B. 
 105.  Singer, supra note 19, at 309. 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id. at 323 (emphasis omitted). 
 108.  Id.  
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The use of a vision of property primarily as an investment triggered 
and exacerbated the Foreclosure Crisis and informed the policies meant to 
stem it.  Before the Foreclosure Crisis, the “Investment Model” was used to 
justify the goal of homeownership for all because the economic benefits ap-
peared to be secure and extensive (a view upon which the government, real 
estate agents,
109
 and banks were all on board).  During the Foreclosure Cri-
sis, this model appears to have operated abysmally for bad investors and ra-
ther poorly for good investors.
110
  For bad investors (or “irresponsible” in-
vestors as they are called below),
111
 their expectations and situation ex 
ante—the information available to them, the analysis done by mortgage 
brokers on their behalf, and the encouragement for them to buy—are not 
considered.  Instead, it seems that if one is facing foreclosure, no expecta-
tions are legitimate ones.  Rather, investors are judged at the moment of en-
try into their mortgage agreements by the ex post condition that they are 
facing foreclosure.  From this place of analysis, “economically justified” 
expectations in Singer’s formulation are reformulated as contractually justi-
fied expectations.
112
  The mortgage contract defined the entire boundaries of 
what an investor is entitled to expect.  By looking at the four corners of a 
“bad” investor’s mortgage contract, any expectation of keeping one’s house 
if one cannot pay the mortgage is not justified; therefore, no regulation is 
necessary to save them (the absence of regulation is also a decision regard-
ing regulation, of course). 
For good investors, or “responsible” home-buyers that were able to 
make their mortgage payments and keep their homes, their problems with 
payments or meeting other creditors were not addressed.  Their expectations 
of economic reward appeared to have been economically justified (even if 
their house was underwater, as long as they were making payments), which 
further supported the idea that strong regulation was not necessary. 
1.  Treating Houses Primarily as Investments 
The idea that buying a house was a good investment, and a reliable 
way of planning for retirement, was not new in property theory or housing 
policy.
113
  In the mid-2000s, however, this model of purchasing houses for 
                                                          
 109.  See White, supra note 77. 
 110.  Both in a slightly different way than it had previously operated.  
 111.  See infra Part II. 
 112.  Singer, supra note 19, at 323. 
 113.  Houses were treated, at least partly, as investments for decades.  See FREUND, supra note 
31.  I argue that in the 1990s, houses began to be seen as investments in an extreme and untenable 
way, which obscured the context of home purchase and attachment.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 105–112.  
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the purpose of investment was taken to an extreme: First, it was used to en-
courage massive mortgage borrowing and lending;
114
 and second, it was 
used to justify the federal government’s failure to save irresponsible in-
vestments or investors.
115
 
Although houses had been considered investments as well as homes 
for decades, before and during the Foreclosure Crisis this became the pri-
mary lens through which the government treated the purchase of a house.  
This treatment allowed the government to: (1) deprioritize policies that 
would have kept people in their houses, and (2) treat homeowners, during 
the initial TARP phase, as responsible or irresponsible investors who there-
fore might “deserve” losing their investments. 
The analysis during the formulation of policy responses to the Foreclo-
sure Crisis did not take into account the context of the “investments.”  It 
was not driven by any significant recognition that the government had 
played a role in promoting the kinds of homeownership and lending that 
had led to the Crisis; rather, it was primarily dominated by blame for irre-
sponsible borrowers and lenders.
116
  A 2008 statement from Senator Rich-
ard Shelby of Alabama, the senior Republican on the Banking Committee, 
typifies this blaming and framing: “‘There is a line that I believe we should 
not cross. . . . That line is represented by a taxpayer-funded bailout of inves-
tors or homeowners who freely and willingly entered into mortgages that 
they knew or should have known they could not afford.’”117 
There are several aspects of thinking that Senator Shelby’s statement 
highlights.  First, the blame and responsibility is placed only on homeown-
ers and the expectation that they knew or should have known that their 
mortgages would prove unsustainable.
118
  By the time Senator Shelby made 
this statement in 2008, however, evidence of fraud and more complex cau-
sation than mere irresponsible borrowing had been brought to light, but 
                                                          
 114.  Sugrue, supra note 49.  
 115.  See infra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. 
 116.  See Leonhard, supra note 18, at 621 (“Some blame [the financial crisis] on irresponsible 
borrowers who spent money beyond their means in an ill-fated pursuit of the American dream of 
home ownership.”) (citation omitted).  
 117.  David M. Herszenhorn & Vikas Bajaj, Tricky Task of Offering Aid to Homeowners, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at A1. See also MONIQUE W. MORRIS, DISCRIMINATION AND MORTGAGE 
LENDING IN AMERICA: A SUMMARY OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF SUBPRIME LENDING ON 
AFRICAN AMERICANS 2 (2009) (“From Wall Street to Main Street, rumors have dominated the 
public discourse regarding who is most affected by subprime lending and the foreclosure crisis 
that has ensued.  The overall thrust of this discourse has been to blame an ‘irresponsible borrow-
er’; however, deeper analysis reveals a different story.”). 
 118.  Id. 
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such evidence was ignored in many policy discussions.
119
  Second, inves-
tors and homeowners are linked, as if they faced similar goals and fail-
ures.
120
  Other lawmakers similarly focused on the homeowner as a “bor-
rower” as opposed to a seeker or achiever of the American Dream.121  
Third, the idea of assistance is characterized as a “bailout”—the govern-
ment saving the homeowner/investor—as opposed to the government assist-
ing in alleviating a situation that they had no small role in bringing about.
122
  
Finally, there is an apparent commitment to principles with no actual basis 
articulated, e.g., “‘a line that . . . should not [be] cross[ed].’”123  A few 
months later, TARP appeared to cross every line with regard to the 
banks.
124
  It is unclear what operative principle was used to determine that 
bailing out banks that entered into CDOs, which banks should have known 
were risky, did not cross any lines, whereas bailing out individuals who had 
entered into deceptively attractive mortgages would. 
The executive branch also embraced the rhetorical shift of houses from 
homes to fungible investments gained through irresponsible loans.  Phillip 
Swagel, former Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy from December 
2006 through January 2009, wrote a paper on the decisionmaking that oc-
curred in the government during the mortgage and financial crisis.
125
  
Through his position, Swagel, a former academic who, according to An-
drew Ross Sorkin, resembled a “wonky government official,”126 was privy 
to the innermost circles of government decision-making during the Crisis.
127
  
According to Swagel, while the Department of the Treasury had a focus on 
housing and foreclosure prevention after August 2008 (note the late timing), 
there were “political constraints” to having mortgage servicers modify 
loans, even though this approach did not involve public expenditure.
128
  
These political constraints operated tightly “since there was little appetite in 
Congress for a program that would transparently reward ‘irresponsible’ bor-
                                                          
 119.  See White, supra note 77, at 332. 
 120.  See Herszenhorn & Bajaj, supra note 117. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See infra Part II.B. 
 125.  Phillip Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY, Spring 2009, at 2. 
 126.  ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET 
AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 83 (2009). 
 127.  Swagel, supra note 125.  I quote Swagel at length in this Part as his is one of the few true 
insider accounts into how decisions were made during this time. 
 128.  Id.  
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rowers who had purchased homes they could never have hoped to af-
ford.”129 
Swagel’s ambivalence is emblematic of the government’s approach.  
There was a focus on housing but not on assistance; even the use of volun-
tary modifications (which usually reduced monthly mortgage payments and 
not the overall principal amounts, and for which no public money was nec-
essary) was constrained.
130
  According to Swagel, the administration—
including the White House and Department of the Treasury—was unwilling 
to use public money to assist “irresponsible” homeowners, particularly 
those who had purchased “McMansions” or flat screen televisions.131  I ar-
gue that this focus on “irresponsibility” is one of the main considerations132 
driving the unwillingness to enact meaningful regulation. 
While it may have been a very legitimate concern not to bail out peo-
ple who had recklessly overspent beyond their means, to paint this portion 
of the population as material enough to justify no bailout at all is simplistic 
and sounds like an excuse.  It would have taken some work to figure out 
whom to bail out and by how much, but that complexity should not have 
meant that such a project should not have been undertaken.  The rhetorical 
force of the above is clearly manifested in the kinds of regulation that 
emerged from these deliberations, as explained in the next Section.
133
 
Swagel cites public opinion as being against bailouts for homeowners, 
though public opinion against bailing out the banks did not stop the federal 
government from doing so, perhaps because bailing out banks appeared to 
                                                          
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See infra Part II.B. 
 131.  Swagel, supra note 125, at 21.  Swagel explains:  
Congress appeared to heed this [public] opposition as well: there were constant calls for 
the Treasury and the administration to do more on foreclosure prevention, but this was 
just rhetoric.  Until the FDIC came out with a proposal late in 2008, there was no legis-
lative support to spend public money to actually prevent foreclosures—the congres-
sional proposal discussed below ostensibly did not use public funds.  And as discussed 
below in relation to the TARP, even in the fall of 2008, Congress’ desire was for the 
Treasury to spend TARP money for foreclosure avoidance.  Members of Congress did 
not want to have to vote specifically to spend money on this, suggesting that they un-
derstood the poor optics of having the government write checks when some would find 
their way into the hands of ‘irresponsible homeowners.’ 
Id. at 21–22. 
 132.  Michelle Bachmann, A Long Term Mortgage Crisis (Feb. 20, 2009), 
http://bachmann.house.gov/long-term-mortgage-crisis.  Michelle Bachmann continued the irre-
sponsible versus responsible rhetoric on her blog.  Ironically, if one listens to the voices of the 
homeowners, it seems that the so-called “irresponsible” defaulters are “rewarded” with options for 
a bailout, whereas the ones scraping by to make payments are not. 
 133.  See infra Part II.B. 
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be necessary.
134
  Bailing out the lower income portions of the population 
who had been encouraged to purchase homes, in part based on decades of 
government propaganda and legal support, however, does not appear to be 
the material “popular opinion” that was taken into account.135 
The government could have reframed the causes and potential solu-
tions to the Crisis.  It could have taken this opportunity to explain housing 
policy, how it went wrong, and why they were intervening.  Instead, poli-
cymakers sidestepped federal government responsibility and focused on 
voluntary modifications, with no cost to the public.
136
 
Rhetoric in this vein has continued.  During President Obama’s tenure, 
the Department of the Treasury website has explicitly stated that the Home 
Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) discussed below “wasn’t a 
bailout for irresponsible homeowners.”137  Even after so much evidence of 
fraud, fudged paperwork, and improper evaluations were acknowledged, the 
rhetoric still bemoans the culpability of the homeowner, not of the govern-
ment or of the complexity of causation.
138
  I will not attempt to prove 
whether certain homeowners were or were not responsible.  I am attempting 
to demonstrate how the dialogue shifted during the Crisis to blame home-
owners as bad investors in a way that exculpated the government from 
blame or material commitment to a solution.
139
  The policy went from 
championing increases in homeownership numbers, allowing Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac to guarantee nonprime loans, to blaming the perceived ir-
responsible homeowner/investor.
140
  This change in dialogue and the ensu-
ing legal regimes enabled all the homeowners, not just the “responsible” 
ones, to be left behind.
141
 
                                                          
 134.  Swagel, supra note 125 (“[T]he public opposition to such bailouts appeared to be in-
tense—ironically, many people were already angry at the Treasury for supposedly bailing out irre-
sponsible homeowners through Hope Now, even though this did not involve explicit public spend-
ing.”). 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See infra Part II.B. 
 137.  What You Haven’t Heard About TARP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/Pages/Index.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 
2014).  
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 140.  In the sources I cite in this Section, when it is stated that a homeowner was irresponsible, 
it is in the context of a homeowner as an investor—the irresponsibility in question is with regard 
to the investment quality of buying the house, not an irresponsibility as it pertains to the upkeep or 
other responsibilities of owning a house.  See supra text accompanying notes 105–112. 
 141.  See infra Part II.B. 
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2.  Treating Houses as Codified Contracts 
While seeing homes as irresponsible investments may have allowed 
the government to morally refrain from action, seeing homes as purely pri-
vate contractual arrangements (mortgages) between borrower and lender 
enabled the government to stay out of the issue legally.
142
 
As Swagel explained, modifying the mortgages in bankruptcy court 
was attractive partly because it did not cost the federal government any 
money, but also because it would “abrogate” contracts between lenders and 
homeowners: 
 The Treasury opposed the cramdown proposal [to allow bank-
ruptcy courts to retroactively modify mortgages] out of concern 
that abrogating contracts in this way would have undesirable con-
sequences for the future availability of credit, especially to low-
income borrowers. Some current borrowers would benefit from 
having their mortgage balance reduced, but future borrowers 
would find it more difficult to obtain a loan.
143
 
This view is problematic for several reasons.  As explored in Part II.C., 
it inflates certain views of contract law, which not only subsumes property, 
but also leaves behind current low-income and minority borrowers facing 
trouble (purportedly in an effort to protect future low-income borrowers, 
who, at the rate the banks were releasing funds, were unlikely to get credit 
regardless).  Second, it places the government outside the purview of direct 
action with regard to contracts and pits policy choices as necessarily choos-
ing between banks and homeowners, as further discussed below.
144
 
In short, now that homeowners could be thought of as irresponsible in-
vestors and poor contract negotiators, their rights to their homes (invest-
ments) could be limited by the sanctity of contract with their banks and the 
strength of their investment (that is, if they had invested wisely, they would 
not be facing foreclosure).  From this view of the events, policymakers ef-
fectively shifted the rhetoric of houses as “homes” toward houses as in-
vestments and contracts—moreover, as investments primarily for the re-
sponsible investor and contracts for the responsible negotiator.
145
  Either 
way, very few homes were actually worth saving.  Not surprisingly, this 
process decimated both the “castle” and the “for all” visions along the way. 
                                                          
 142.  See Bill Moyers Journal: William K. Black: CSI Bailout  (PBS television broadcast Apr. 
3, 2009), available at www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/04032009/watch.html.. 
 143.  Swagel, supra note 125, at 22–23. 
 144.  See infra Part II. 
 145.  See supra notes 105–112. 
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B.  This Model Leads to Narrow Solutions: Banks v. Homeowners 
Once homes were investments or contracts, this rhetoric translated into 
potential solutions to the Crisis—solutions that were narrowly defined as a 
choice between banks and homeowners.
146
  Because this model had defined 
the entire situation in economic terms, it is hardly surprising that banks 
were prioritized because the Crisis was now taken to be on the “systemic” 
and financial market level.
147
  A multi-dimensional approach to the various 
problems in the Crisis was ignored as it was seen to be a financial situation 
that needed a financial fix.
148
  And so, the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”), which was passed as part of a larger act, the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”),149 (the only regulation with real 
funding behind it) did not actually provide support for the homeowners, as 
shown by its provisions and implementation. 
In its initial form, TARP did not mention any help for mortgage hold-
ers,
150
 and in its final form, it barely did.  The problems of homeowners fac-
ing foreclosure were not going to be alleviated directly by saving the banks, 
and therefore, funding was allocated towards modification and help for 
homeowners through certain provisions in TARP.  According to Neil 
Barofsky, Special Inspector General for TARP, these provisions were not 
meant to be “mere window dressing that needed only to be taken ‘into ac-
count.’  Rather, they were a central part of the compromise with reluctant 
members of Congress to cast a vote that in many cases proved to be politi-
                                                          
 146.  See Sugrue, supra note 49. 
 147.  See Bill Moyers Journal, supra note 142.  Then-Secretary of Treasury Hank Paulson was 
interviewed by Jim Lehrer.  See Paulson Defends Federal Financial Rescue Effort, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Nov. 13, 2008), www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec08/paulson_11-
13.html.  When Lehrer asked him about TARP, Paulson played exactly to the reframing—away 
from housing, away from government responsibility, and arguing that the best thing for the strug-
gling homeowners was to have the financial system in working order.  Id.  This Article attempts to 
present alternatives to that frame of thinking. 
 148.  See EDWARD V. MURPHY & BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22957, 
PROPOSAL TO ALLOW TREASURY TO BUY MORTGAGE-RELATED ASSETS TO ADDRESS 
FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 1 (2008), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110286.pdf. 
 149.  Id.  
 150.  See id. at 4 (“The September 20 draft proposal did not include any provisions specifically 
designed to help home owners facing foreclosure.  The September 21 draft requires loan servicers 
to follow industry best practices and to modify loans in accordance with the Hope for Homeown-
ers Oversight Board.  Proponents of such measures might argue that actions to unfreeze mortgage 
markets will help liquidity flow back into mortgage markets, which in turn might make it easier 
for borrowers to refinance out of troubled mortgages or sell their homes to avoid foreclosure.  
Critics might counter that this is a relatively expensive and indirect way to aid troubled mortgage 
borrowers.”). 
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cal suicide.”151  Barofsky, upon stepping down from his post, published an 
op-ed in the New York Times in which he laid out his frustrations with the 
way TARP did not support the homeowners for whom it had been designed 
because the provision for homeowners was not implemented in any mean-
ingful way.
152
  Specifically, the Treasury Department provided TARP funds 
to the banks without any requirements or incentives to extend credit or in-
crease lending to homebuyers, and without “even . . . request[ing] that 
banks report how they used TARP funds.”153 
A look at the text of TARP confirms the ambiguity Barofsky  outlines 
above and reveals that it is unclear whether it was really meant to help.
154
  
The preamble does not mention homeowners; it is for the financial system 
and taxpayers.
155
  Referring only to mortgages as “certain types of troubled 
assets,” TARP sees them from a financial system’s point of view as bundled 
and securitized, not as held by individual homeowners: 
An Act To provide authority for the Federal Government to pur-
chase and insure certain types of troubled assets for the purposes 
of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the economy 
and financial system and protecting taxpayers, to amend the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide incentives for energy 
production and conservation, to extend certain expiring provi-
sions, to provide individual income tax relief, and for other pur-
poses.
156
 
                                                          
 151.  Neil Barofsky, Where the Bailout Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2011, at A27.  
Barofsky added:  
The act’s emphasis on preserving homeownership was particularly vital to passage. 
Congress was told that TARP would be used to purchase up to $700 billion of mortgag-
es, and, to obtain the necessary votes, Treasury promised that it would modify those 
mortgages to assist struggling homeowners.  Indeed, the act expressly directs the de-
partment to do just that.  But it has done little to abide by this legislative bargain.  Al-
most immediately, as permitted by the broad language of the act, Treasury’s plan for 
TARP shifted from the purchase of mortgages to the infusion of hundreds of billions of 
dollars into the nation’s largest financial institutions, a shift that came with the express 
promise that it would restore lending. 
Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Troubled Assets Relief Program, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id.; see also id. at § 119(b) (“(1) TREATMENT OF HOMEOWNERS’ RIGHTS—The terms of 
any residential mortgage loan that is part of any purchase by the Secretary under this Act shall 
remain subject to all claims and defenses that would otherwise apply, notwithstanding the exercise 
of authority by the Secretary under this Act”); Robert Pear, Crisis Puts Tax Moves into Play, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/business/02tax.html. 
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Section 2 explicates the purpose of the EESA, which is to immediately 
restore liquidity and stability of the financial system (albeit in a way that 
“preserves homeownership”).157  By my interpretation, the primary purpose 
of TARP is not to actually protect people from losing their homes, but ra-
ther to save the financial system: 
SEC. 2. PURPOSES.  The purposes of this Act are—(1) to im-
mediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the 
Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial 
system of the United States; and (2) to ensure that such authority 
and such facilities are used in a manner that—(A) protects home 
values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life savings; (B) 
preserves homeownership and promotes jobs and economic 
growth; (C) maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers of the 
United States; and (D) provides public accountability for the ex-
ercise of such authority.
158
 
The two sections of the Act that address mortgages
159
 and the one that 
amends the HOPE Act
160
 merely direct Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
“encourage” mortgage servicers to modify mortgages.161  This “encourag-
ing” language is hardly a call to action.  Not surprisingly, these sections did 
not result in any real change for homeowners.
162
 
                                                          
 157.  H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 2. 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Sections 109 and 110 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act apply to mortgages.  
Id. §§ 109, 110.  Section 109 focuses on “foreclosure mitigation efforts,” and § 110 addresses “as-
sistance to homeowners.”  Id. 
 160.  HOPE for Homeowners Program, 12 U.S.C. § 1715 (2008). 
 161.  Ryan Sherriff & Jeffrey Lubell, What’s in a Name? Clarifying the Different Forms and 
Policy Objectives of “Shared Equity” and “Shared Appreciation” Homeownership Programs, 
CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY 11 (2009), 
http://www.nhc.org/media/documents/Clarifying_Shared_Equity_Homeownership.pdf.  Sheriff 
and Lubell discuss the goal of the mortgage programs: 
The goal of [Hope for Homeowners] is to facilitate the refinancing of at-risk mortgages 
with more affordable mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).  
Lenders choosing to participate in the program are required to reduce the principal bal-
ances of loans to no more than 90 percent of the current appraised value of a borrower’s 
home.  In return, FHA provides insurance for the refinanced loans, protecting the lend-
ers from losses due to any further defaults.  To recoup some of the losses expected from 
insuring these loans, and to create incentives for refinancing households to stay in their 
homes, a number of equity-sharing features have been included . . . .  To date, Hope for 
Homeowners has experienced very low volume—in large part, many argue, due to ex-
cessive red tape and a lack of strong incentives for lenders to participate. 
Id. 
 162.  Swagel, supra note 125.  
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If, as Secretary of Treasury Hank Paulson claimed,
163
 TARP was not 
meant to help homeowners, then what was?  Other acts, such as House and 
Economic Rights Advocates (“HERA”), HOPE, and HAMP, have proved 
mostly ineffective.
164
  Barofsky bemoans this lack of action as well, because 
fewer loans have been actually modified than planned:  
 [TARP]’s goal of helping struggling homeowners was shelved 
until February 2009, when the Home Affordable Modification 
Program [HAMP] was announced with the promise to help up to 
four million families with mortgage modifications. 
 That program has been a colossal failure, with far fewer perma-
nent modifications (540,000) than modifications that have failed 
and been canceled (over 800,000).  This is the well-chronicled re-
sult of the rush to get the program started, major program design 
flaws like the failure to remedy mortgage servicers’ favoring of 
foreclosure over permanent modifications, and a refusal to hold 
those abysmally performing mortgage servicers accountable for 
their disregard of program guidelines.  As the program flounders, 
foreclosures continue to mount, with 8 million to 13 million fil-
ings forecast over the program’s lifetime.165 
In the struggle to identify the “best” policy to stem the overall Crisis, 
the economic rhetoric from the Commodity Model made bailing out the 
banks appear to be “rational” because it was based on known values (liquid-
ity, economic efficiency, the financial system) and it seemed more predicta-
ble and less risky (and not as fuzzy as “homes”) than alternatives based on 
preventing mortgage defaults.
166
  This meant that TARP for the banks came 
first, actually almost immediately; and TARP for the homeowners was lost 
in the shuffle.
167
  And, although not everyone in Congress agreed with the 
prevailing views on how homeowners should be treated, the dissenters ap-
                                                          
 163.  See Paulson Defends Federal Financial Rescue Effort, supra note 147. 
 164.  Davidson & Dyal-Chand, supra note 13, at 1628–31.  Regarding HAMP, see Home 
Foreclosures: Will Voluntary Mortgage Modification Help Families Save Their Homes? (Part 1): 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Alan M. White, Professor, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/White090709.pdf.  See also JOINT CTR. FOR 
HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING (2011), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/son2011.pdf [hereinafter STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING]. 
 165.  See Barofsky, supra note 151. 
 166.  Swagel, supra note 125, at 2–3. 
 167.  Id. 
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pear to have largely failed,
168
 and the use of the Commodity Model largely 
continues to inform policy today.
169
 
C.  This Commodity Model Advances Problematic Versions of Property 
Rights 
This Section explores both how the use of the Commodity Model 
worked in practice, as well as the problematic implications of using this 
version of property rights.  First, this model uses investment criteria to 
judge the deserving homebuyer and worthiness of the house itself, which 
gives rise to an excessive emphasis on the monetary and market value of a 
house.
170
  Second, this model treats houses as fungible entities.
171
  Finally, it 
treats the entirety of the entitlement of owners as limited to the four corners 
of the mortgage contract, which allows contract to subsume property 
through extreme forms of at least three assumptions—efficiency, liberty, 
and the private nature of contracts.
172
 
1.  Treating Houses (Solely) as Investments and House-Buyers 
(Solely) as Investors 
The Commodity Model judges whether a house-buyer deserves to 
keep his house based on the same criteria one might use to judge an inves-
tor.  As Joseph Singer noted: “An owner who has invested capital deserves 
the rewards that accompany the delayed gratification associated with in-
vestment.”173  The rhetoric and resulting policy described above shows how 
deserving and responsible went hand-in-hand with regard to house-buyers 
and aid.
174
  Similar to investors, the people who bought houses irresponsibly 
                                                          
 168.  See Neil Irwin, Lawmakers Blast Paulson’s Management of Bailout, WASH. POST, Nov. 
19, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/18/ 
AR2008111801283.html; Emily Kaiser & Karey Wutkowski, Lawmakers Rap Treasury on 
Bailout Plan, REUTERS, Nov. 12, 2011, available at 
http://us.mobile.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE4B874820081211?i=2&irpc=932; 
Greg Robb & Ronald D. Orol, Democrats Lash Out at Paulson over Mortgages, MARKET WATCH 
(Nov. 18, 2011, 5:23 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/paulson-bair-clash-over-aid-to-
troubled-homeowners. 
 169.  See Barofsky, supra note 151;White, supra note 77. 
 170.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 171.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 172.  See infra Part II.C.3. 
 173.  Singer, supra note 19, at 322 (referring to Lockean approach).  
 174.  Id. 
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or beyond their means did not “deserve” to keep their homes.175  Basically, 
whether these people deserve their house or whether they were responsible 
depends entirely on whether their investment (the market value of their 
house) did well.
176
 
This scenario might have existed before the Crisis.  Certainly, if one 
bought a house far outside one’s means, one might have lost it if one could 
no longer afford it.  But, as further explained in Part III, the inflated rhetoric 
around responsibility as applied to only monetary terms made avoiding 
“saving” homeowners even easier when in fact, conditions outside of 
homebuyers’ control should have made “saving” them more, not less, at-
tractive.
177
  These conditions—increased use of new mortgage instruments 
that were formulated to encourage investments with deceptively attractive 
rates—rendered it difficult to effectively judge the viability of one’s in-
vestment or to invest responsibly.  Moreover, at least some buyers with 
good credit (responsible buyers, perhaps) were pushed into subprime loans 
despite their eligibility for more favorable rates.
178
  From the vantage point 
of many of the homebuyers facing foreclosure after 2005, it is not clear 
what makes them any less deserving of their homes as opposed to those 
who may have been in similar financial circumstances in 2000 but were 
steered toward a prime loan or fixed rate instrument and (because of exces-
sively favorable market conditions not foreseeable to the average house-
buyer, or the average financier for that matter) got to keep their house.
179
  
This view also does not take into the account the context of why people en-
tered into investments, or what made it no longer tenable, as explored in 
Part III.
180
 
The Commodity Model also perceives of the value of a house in only 
monetary terms.  In a discussion of Kelo v. City of New London,
181
 a case 
involving eminent domain, Singer posits more than one possibility where 
the City of New London could have had the power to take the Kelos’ prop-
erty as long as it paid fair market value, which would further the view that 
the “property is worth what it would likely fetch on the open market, no 
                                                          
 175.  People appeared to be treated as homogenous irresponsible investors.  Also, complicating 
this point, the “responsible” people, who just barely kept up with their mortgage, had no aid in-
stead of very little aid.  
 176.  Id. 
 177.  See infra Part III. 
 178.  White, supra note 77, at 315.  In the case of homebuyers choosing to be foreclosed, how-
ever, their breach was criticized as a poor moral decision, as opposed to an investment.  Id.  
 179.  See Korngold, supra note 18, at 730–32. 
 180.  See infra Part III. 
 181.  125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
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more and no less,” and that payment makes owners whole; meaning, if 
owners are “rational,”182 they should be “indifferent between keeping the 
house and receiving the money.”183 Singer was not attempting to advance 
this view, but rather was presenting one way of seeing the situation in Ke-
lo.
184
  He goes on to acknowledge that “almost everyone would agree that 
the Kelos have a legitimate complaint when they argue that the money is 
not the same as the house.”185  What was a caricature seems to have mor-
phed into a policy view during the Foreclosure Crisis.  It is not that policy-
makers did not know or acknowledge that it was painful to lose a home, but 
they did not value this pain in policy practice because the only way to value 
what is lost is to look at the market value of the house.
186
  The use of this 
metric is related to the fungibility point below, but it also reflects a more 
general way of seeing a homeowner as an investor and judging them on in-
vestment terms.  Indeed, it describes a vision where the metrics that consti-
tute what matters in property and housing are the same metrics by which 
investments are measured.
187
 
In Kelo, the metric was market value.  During the Foreclosure Crisis, 
the metric included market value (when used to describe the loss, as de-
tailed above), but also more generally characterized people who bought 
homes as responsible and deserving a reward, or irresponsible and not de-
serving a reward.  Further, this metric was based on the same criteria one 
would use to judge an investor.  Did they win in the market?  Were they 
lucky?  To put the assertions in this Part very simply, the Commodity Mod-
el, as used during the Crisis, uses good investor criteria to give homeowners 
their just desserts.  If a homeowner was not responsible, not only would she 
lose her investment, but she would deserve to as well.  Moreover, because 
the loss is measured only according to the monetary value of the house, the 
losing investor appears to lose his monetary investment, no more, no less 
(to paraphrase Singer’s point above).188 
Therefore, market value plays a role in several ways—it is not just the 
metric that is used to judge the amount of a house-buyer’s loss, but it is also 
used as the primary metric that determines whether there should have been 
                                                          
 182.  Singer, supra note 19, at 315.  With terms like ‘rational’ pervasively used in the rhetoric 
of investment and houses, how could any alternative frameworks with different values be taken 
seriously?  
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at 315–16. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See VAN DER WALT, supra note 11. 
 188.  Singer, supra note 19, at 315.   
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an initial investment (“responsible” investor ex ante) and whether there 
should be a loss at all (“deserving” investor ex poste).189  This excessive re-
liance on market value is problematic because of the complexities of the 
housing market
190
 and because of the treatment of houses as fungible, as 
explained in the next Part.
191
 
Treating houses as merely investments was self-fulfilling as well.  En-
couragement of homeownership for all, and the accompanying decreased 
regulation of mortgage lending, enabled mortgage loans to be made by local 
banks and later sold off to investment banks.
192
  So, local banks not only 
avoided the risk of such loans, but also avoided the emotional responsibility 
attached to handling foreclosures.  The same community loan officers who 
had given the loan were no longer the ones deciding and structuring fore-
closure (or loan modification) and having to face the consequences of their 
decisions in their own communities.
193
 
2.  Fungible Property 
The treatment of homeowners as investors whose investments could 
and should be taken away based on investment criteria shifted the concept 
of a “home” to that of a fungible investment.  Investments are generally 
fungible in nature—the value is in the increased wealth that one hopes to 
reap after some time and not in the attachment to the thing invested in.
194
  
Investments are a means to an end.  Residences, however, are generally not 
thought of in only that way.  Homes are personal.
195
  One might buy a house 
with the plan that it appreciate and gain monetary value, but the idea of a 
home is far greater than the dollars and cents a house might eventually de-
liver.
196
  This respect for the home has informed the law, which has protect-
                                                          
 189.  Regarding the last point, whether one deserves the loss depends on a measurement of the 
value of the house based on market value.  If the market value decreased to the point of making 
the investment unsustainable for the buyer, then the buyer is seen, ex poste, as deserving that loss. 
 190.  Individual investments in housing faced difficulties in realistic assessments because of, 
inter alia, asymmetrical available information, government involvement in promotion of lending, 
excessive rhetoric extolling the values of homeownership, incentives for mortgage brokers, legal 
structures of lending and borrowing, unequal bargaining power, and fraud.  See Korngold, supra 
note 18, at 732–35.  These phenomena are addressed throughout this Article. 
 191.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 192.  See Korngold, supra note 18, at 730–32. 
 193.  See White, supra note 77, at 631–32 (listing estimations of the “external costs imposed 
on communities” by foreclosures).  My thanks to Erica Steinberger for discussion on this point. 
 194.  D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 278 
(2006). 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 278–79. 
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ed the home as compared to other kinds of property through various 
measures such as search and seizure law and the tax code.
197
 
This idea of sacredness of the “home” is tied intimately with the rheto-
ric and policies surrounding the American Dream as explained above: secu-
rity, community, family, and self.
198
  Once the romance of the home had be-
come so embedded in American imaginations as the ideas of “home” and 
“the American Dream,” it is hardly surprising that losses of homes during 
the Crisis were emotionally traumatic because people felt like they were 
losing parts of themselves.
199
 
Seeing a house primarily as an investment fails to take into account all 
of the emotional and social attachment that people have to their homes, and 
this stripping of the value placed on the home regresses from the legal pro-
tection it has been previously afforded.  Once the emotional and social at-
tachment is ignored, it becomes much easier to justify the laws and policies 
that do not protect the home or the homeowner.
200
 
Baltimore and other places with foreclosed properties show the mis-
match between a fungibility model and the actual property rights at stake.
201
  
The bank has rights in a borrower’s payments and a security interest in the 
house, although the bank does not have rights to all that constitutes the 
“home.”202  The house is fungible to the bank, where it is valued based only 
on monetary terms.  When a foreclosure happens, the owner often loses 
much more than just the house’s market value because the house is often 
not fungible to an owner.
203
 
The alternative vision more fully explored in Part III sees the object 
that was invested in—the house—and takes into account the context and the 
loss of the investment.
204
  This inquiry includes considering the following 
factors: what induced the owner to buy (the bank’s actions, the government 
policies); the fact that owners stand to lose more than money if the house is 
                                                          
 197.  Id. at 255–56, 304–05.  
 198.  See Robert J. Schiller, The Scars of Losing a Home, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/business/18view.html. 
 199.  Id.  I am sympathetic to the intuition that the home is not fungible, and I would also like 
to note that renters need to be included in the definition of “home” and the values it brings.  As 
further explained in Part IV, it is time to rethink ownership as an institution, and part of that would 
mean expanding the notion of what it means to “have” (rather than “own”) a home. 
 200.  See supra text accompanying notes 113–141. 
 201.  See Barros, supra note 194, at 277–82 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of a per-
sonal versus fungible view of property, the latter of which factors in emotions, personal comfort, 
and identity, among others). 
 202.  Id. at 282–84. 
 203.  See supra note 198. 
 204.  See infra Part III. 
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foreclosed; where the owner will live if foreclosure occurs; the owner’s fi-
nancial situation; how the city will lend support or cope with the issue; the 
impact on schools and education for any children of the family; and other 
factors in formulating policy and law.
205
 
3.  Freedom of Contract 
The Commodity Model also shifts focus away from the tangible house 
to the mortgage and the contract that enshrines it, as evidenced by the regu-
latory focus on not abrogating contracts and the reluctance to modify 
them.
206
  This disassociation of the actual house (or the object of the mort-
gage, which is the object of the contract) from treatment of the situation and 
the ensuing primacy of the nature of the contract has several implications 
for the property regime.  Although this Article could explore the implica-
tions for the contract regime—namely, through a reality check on the as-
sumptions of free markets, symmetrical information, and equal bargaining 
power
207—this Section will focus on the treatment of contracts only as it in-
tersects with (and subsumes) the property regime, so as not to lose the 
house in all this (again). 
As other scholars have noted, “freedom of contract” is generally meant 
to promote two values—efficiency and liberty208—through private ar-
rangements.  This Section explores how the extreme and unrealistic ver-
sions of efficiency, liberty, and the private nature of contracts that were fur-
thered during the Foreclosure Crisis operated to subsume legitimate forms 
of property rights and values.
209 
                                                          
 205.  See Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair Housing 
Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. 
REV. 164, 170–73 (2009) (briefly describing “some of the key features of the subprime mortgage 
market that have led to its ultimate demise”). 
 206.  See supra text accompanying note 143. 
 207.  For some interesting coverage of this, see Leonhard, supra note 18.  Leonhard explores 
severe informational asymmetry and unequal bargaining power, which plagued subprime mort-
gage transactions. Id. at 623, 629–33. 
 208.  Korngold, supra note 84, at 1543 (“Freedom of contract incorporates various concepts, 
all of which support the enforcement of agreements allocating rights in real estate, whether involv-
ing a conveyance of a full fee simple absolute or the carving out of a lesser possessory or non-
possessory interest.  Such consensual arrangements should be enforced as a general matter be-
cause of considerations of efficiency and liberty.”). 
 209.  See infra Part II.C.3.a. 
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a.  The Rhetoric of Efficiency Versus the Reality of Property 
Values 
According to an economic analysis of the law, “[t]he enforcement of 
freely-made contracts involving land rights serves to achieve an efficient 
allocation of our limited land resources.  Through voluntary market transac-
tions, property rights end up in the hands of those who most value them and 
who will best utilize them.”210  This deceptively simple justification of con-
tracts based on efficiency raises a need to prioritize what kinds of value and 
uses, as well as whose values and uses, need to be assessed when enforcing 
contracts.  A quick revisit of two concepts discussed above—market value 
as a measure of value and fungibility of the home—shows that contrary to 
the above quotation, in many cases of foreclosure, allegedly freely-made 
contracts did not direct property to the hands of those who most valued or 
best utilized them.
211
 
If “those who value [something] most” is meant to be synonymous 
with those who will pay the most, this view once again judges “value” 
falsely on monetary terms only.
212
  Attempting to compare the kind of  val-
ue (emotional, monetary, mental) that an individual or household might 
have in their already lived-in home with the kind of value (monetary) that a 
bank holds in the form of a security interest is like comparing apples and 
oranges, or perhaps worse, comparing apple tree seeds with apple pie.  This 
is further complicated by the difficulty of reselling the house during the 
2007 to 2010 period: in the case of foreclosure, it appears that the house 
now transfers from those who value it greatly (on whatever terms), to an en-
tity that is unable to extract their desired kind of value from it (as banks 
have had difficulty re-selling). 
Moreover, even if one argues that a bank really values the security in-
terest in the house (i.e. its confidence in the viability of the security interest 
gives it confidence to give mortgages), it should still be acknowledged that 
the other kinds of values, such as emotional attachment, remain lost when 
the property is transferred to the bank.  As explained above in the discus-
sion regarding fungibility, the actual property may often encompass differ-
ent kinds of value other than monetary value; but if the bank does not value 
those other things, they are lost.
213
  In short, because so much depends on 
how one defines “efficiency” and “value,” it is unclear whether enforcing 
                                                          
 210.  Korngold, supra note 84, at 1543 (emphasis added).  
 211.  See supra Part II.C.1–2. 
 212.  See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 213.  See supra Part II.C.2. 
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mortgage agreements to their exact letter during the Foreclosure Crisis ac-
tually leads to efficient and valuable outcomes. 
Regarding the second aspect of the idea of efficiency, the evidence 
raised from Baltimore poses questions as to what kind of use and whose use 
is prioritized.  In Baltimore, foreclosed houses have often been left to rot 
when they prove impossible to sell.
214
  Clearly, this cannot be effective uti-
lization or use of property rights to a property.  Moreover, owning a parcel 
of land does not give one a right to destroy it.
215
  Perhaps banks could have 
utilized the borrower’s payments (even if modified) in a better way than the 
actual house, especially when it sits empty.
216
  Confining property and 
housing discourse to the efficiency/utilization/monetary value terms does 
not fit when homes, communities, and social welfare are involved so pro-
foundly. 
If efficiency as an economic goal is meant to maximize wealth and 
minimize costs, then once again, the situation furthered in the Foreclosure 
Crisis was inefficient in several ways.  First, the Crisis overall resulted in a 
massive loss for the U.S. economy.
217
  Second, it is worth looking at whose 
wealth was maximized (that is, banks that shorted mortgage backed securi-
ties) and who suffered losses (that is, cities, taxpayers, homeowners, and 
many commercial banks).  Third, limited land resources, as explored in Bal-
timore, are going to waste.
218
 
Even if efficient contracts are a goal, when circumstances change mod-
ification should still be a possibility.  The model used during the Crisis saw 
government involvement in modification as an abrogation of contract.
219
  
The lack of modification, however, led to the losses discussed above. Per-
haps the reluctance to get involved with modification was also exacerbated 
by the implicit support for castles and the non-interconnectedness of com-
                                                          
 214.  Jannell Ross, Banks Fail to Maintain Foreclosed Homes in Minority Neighborhoods: 
Report, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 4, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/04/banks-
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 215.  Singer, supra note 19, at 321.  
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munities.  Still, modification might have spread the costs of the Crisis and 
mitigated the costs overall; instead it placed them squarely away from 
banks and onto homeowners and taxpayers. 
b.  Liberty Through Property Rights 
In an ideal world, the promotion of liberty through freely-made con-
tracts and private property rights would accord with each other.  The ability 
to decide the terms of one’s ownership and payment for a home of one’s 
own together would form the foundation from which one could securely 
participate in society.
220
  When the idea of liberty in contract is taken to its 
extreme, however, it may be used to justify allowing people to enter into 
any kind of contract.  Contract law itself limits the kinds of contracts that 
will be upheld in court.  For example, a contract of an illegal activity such 
as blackmail will not be upheld.  Rather than focus on the extreme, detri-
mental way contract law and its rhetoric was implemented, this Section will 
highlight how the excessive focus on liberty, in the contract sense, serves to 
hamper liberty in the property sense. 
The excessive focus on liberty in contracts led to the deregulation of 
the mortgage industry—both the kinds of banks that could give mortgages 
and the kinds of mortgage instruments they used.  Both of these innovations 
enabled the situation in Baltimore and other cities to unfold.  The resulting 
instability of peoples’ property holdings certainly did not promote the kinds 
of liberty that property is meant to promote, nor did it appear to be based on 
a legal form of liberty in contract negotiation. 
Also, the focus on liberty drove the federal government’s action not to 
force banks to modify contracts.
221
  While this was in line with previous 
case law regarding compulsive modification, I argue that it goes against 
other well-established norms of contract law.  Robin West’s analysis of 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.
222
 is instructive.  Williams 
hinged on a “cross-collateral term in the installment sales contract for con-
sumer goods between the retail store and [an] indigent customer.”223  Ac-
cording to the term, all of the buyer’s previous purchases from the store 
were deemed to be collateral in exchange for credit and an installment 
                                                          
 220.  Singer, supra note 19, at 311.  See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & 
PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970 
(1997) (discussing the two sides of liberty in property—both freedom from public interference and 
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 221.  See Swagel, supra note 125. 
 222.  350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 223.  Robin L. West, The Anti-Empathic Turn 14 (Geo. Pub. L. Research Paper No. 11-97, 
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method of payment for new goods.
224
  This meant “the buyer could lose all 
past purchased products if she defaulted on a payment for the later-
purchased goods.”225  The court held that “as a matter of law . . . the trial 
judge had the power to rule that this . . . cross-collateral term was uncon-
scionable.”226 
West uses Williams to demonstrate the paternalistic and moralistic as-
pects of the court’s decision.  The court’s decision has been criticized by 
numerous commentators as paternalistic in that it limited the choices avail-
able to buyers (including future buyers other than Ms. Williams) who 
would “prefer to buy cheaper consumer goods with onerous cross-collateral 
terms rather than higher priced goods without those terms.”227 These critics, 
according to West, would argue that in this process “poor consumers—one 
group the unconscionability doctrine is presumably designed to protect—
lose out.”228  The decision is also seen as paternalistic in that the judge 
“substitute[ed] his or her judgment for that of the weaker contracting party 
in the transaction itself.”229  The Williams court undid the decisionmaking 
of the weaker party, who may have weighed their own interests and possi-
bility of default and yet assumed the risk on his or her own.
230
 
While this decision has been criticized for these two paternalistic 
moves, it has been defended on both paternalistic and moralistic grounds.  
West first discusses the general view that buyers may not clearly know their 
own interests or credit-worthiness, and that because of this, contracts are 
limited in certain areas (for example, in the sale of body parts, health regu-
lations, and child labor).
231
  Moreover, according to West and Russell 
Korobkin, intervention in paternalistic terms may be justified based on a 
behavioral economic approach.
232
  Further, West argues that Korobkin’s 
behavioral economic analysis of Williams concludes that:  
 Rather, limited judicial paternalism might be occasionally justi-
fied on the grounds that sometimes individuals are not very good 
at figuring out the probabilities that they’ll get what they decide 
“is good for them” from the various choices in front of them, giv-
en certain constraints on their abilities to reason about their op-
                                                          
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id.  
 227.  Id. at 15. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. at 16. 
 230.  Id. at 20. 
 231.  Id at 24–25. 
 232.  Id. at 19.  
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tions.  Paternalism is justified, in other words, not on the grounds 
that “people are idiots” (as Duncan Kennedy artfully put the point 
in his classic defense of judicial paternalism from the mid-1980s) 
but rather, on the grounds that individuals—even smart and edu-
cated nonidiotic individuals—are often not particularly ration-
al.
233
 
West then refers to Seana Shiffrin’s history of the unconscionability 
doctrine and how it was “motivated by moralistic revulsion at the contract-
ing behavior of stronger parties, not simply on paternalism per se.”234  In 
the case of Williams, West then concludes: 
 The offending term in Williams might, Judge Wright held, be 
found by the trial court to be “unconscionable,” but not because 
Wright believed that from that moment forthwith, buyers should 
never again be permitted to enter contracts with cross-collateral 
loan terms, even if they want to, either because “people are idi-
ots” or because they suffer from impaired rationality.  Rather, the 
trial court below should be empowered to strike the term if the 
judge found a cluster of factors that pertained to the particular 
case to be, simply, unconscionable: that the buyer was indigent, 
which the seller in that case knew, that the buyer had eight chil-
dren, which the seller knew, that on the buyer’s limited monthly 
income, the buyer could not possibly make the requisite payments 
for the stereo she was seeking to purchase, which the seller either 
knew or should have known, that the buyer had only a small bal-
ance outstanding on the prior purchased items when she entered 
the offensive contract, which the seller knew, and that the buyer 
at the time of default had long since paid considerably more than 
the purchase price of those prior purchased items, which of 
course the seller knew.  On such a record, Wright held, the trial 
judge below would be within his power to strike the term.
235
 
The factors West lays out above—indigency, limited income, limited 
available information, credit-worthiness, unbalanced payment terms, and 
likelihood of default—are strikingly analogous to many of the homebuyers 
who lost their houses during the Foreclosure Crisis.
236
  What does Williams 
teach us as to the Foreclosure Crisis?  Basically, that when we say “liberty” 
we do not mean it in the absolute extreme.  Or, if we do, we should also 
acknowledge who wins and loses.  And, Williams also teaches that moral-
                                                          
 233.  Id. (citation omitted).  For further discussion on paternalism, contracts, and the subprime 
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 234.  West, supra note 223, at 26.  
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ism can have a place to intervene in the legal decisions.  In the current Cri-
sis, by focusing on certain paternalistic aspects of the justification not to in-
tervene in mortgages, the moralistic side of how banks had treated home-
owners during and after negotiations has been lost. 
As Williams introduces and Part III below explores, the context of the 
contract and the investment should matter in crafting legal decisions.  Per-
haps if the government had acknowledged the massive bad faith
237
 that went 
into bargaining for the mortgage contract, they would not have been so 
loathe to support modification more directly.  Modification might have been 
seen as necessary to even out the vastly uneven playing field on which the 
negotiators had met.
238
  The government might have acknowledged just 
how freely the market was operating.  Looking at who lost out during this 
process from the start—the poor, minorities, poorer cities—would have re-
vealed the kinds of liberty promoted by the freely-made contracts.
239
 
c.  Private Nature of Contracts 
As Phillip Swagel points out, and as anyone paying attention to the 
news during the Foreclosure Crisis would recall, much of the justification 
for not intervening directly in mortgage contracts rested on the idea that 
these contracts were private in nature and were between lender and borrow-
er.
240
  While this narrow construction may be true on its face, this view 
closes off the possibility of delving into the unequal power of the negotia-
tors.  This point is well covered by other scholarship,
241
 so this Section will 
look at the context and the system in which the contracts were created and 
argue that the government played, and has always played, a large role in the 
housing market and mortgages, and that its involvement in mortgages gone 
wrong would not be the earth-shattering step into pure, private territory as it 
has been characterized. 
First, the government guarantees the credit risk in mortgage.
242
  In re-
lation to this government involvement in guarantees, Adam Levitin argued 
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that while in “the ideal world” he would “unequivocally prefer to see the 
U.S. housing finance system financed entirely with private capital,” in prac-
tice, the idea of eliminating the government guarantee is not practical and 
would “kill the housing market.”243  In other words, the existence of the 
government’s guarantees on credit risk of borrowers is what makes these 
private contracts possible in the first place.  Levitin went on to argue that 
the “privatization” of the housing finance system would expose the private 
capital currently used to finance mortgages to the credit risk from which 
they are currently insulated because of the existence of government guaran-
tees.
244
  If the mortgage itself is not entirely private in that the guarantor ex-
ists off the page,
245
 then why not allow the last resort guarantor to have a 
say in modification if modifying might better preserve all parties’ property? 
Second, the history of the federal government’s involvement with the 
mortgage industry and the American Dream explored in Part I further sup-
port Levitin’s point.  The federal government, through a variety of pro-
grams, regulations, non-regulations, and the legal regime, had promoted 
conditions that increased the very mortgages from which they sought to dis-
tance themselves in the 2000s.
246
 
Third, as Nestor Davidson and Rashmi Dyal-Chand explain, the gov-
ernment had preserved the banks’ property by drawing on different legal 
norms regarding the privacy of property compared to what they used with 
regard to the homeowners.
247
  Davidson and Dyal-Chand argue that the reg-
ulatory treatment of the homeowners “adopted wholesale the ‘steady-state’ 
property norms that prevail during times of relatively stable equilibrium, 
embodying the relatively more isolationist, opportunity-oriented, risk-
rewarding view of ownership[,]” which “dictated choosing the least radical 
solutions that protected existing property institutions.”248  Yet “in . . . re-
sponse to failures in wider financial markets, property has arguably liberat-
ed regulatory intervention” and regulators adopted “a more interconnected, 
distribution-protective, stability-oriented, and coordinated view of proper-
                                                          
Levitin, Professor, Geo. Univ. Law Ctr.), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112Shrg73756/pdf/CHRG-112Shrg73756.pdf. 
 243.  Id.  Levitin further elaborates: “[d]espite privatization’s ideological appeal, there is a 
fundamental problem with privatization proposals for the housing finance system: they don’t 
work.  Indeed, fully private housing finance systems simply do not exist in the developed world.”  
Id. at 51. 
 244.  Id.  
 245.  Id. 
 246.  See Cisneros, supra note 60, at 30–31. 
 247.  Davidson & Dyal-Chand, supra note 13, at 1645.  
 248.  Id. 
 566 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:523 
 
ty.”249  They further recognize that, with respect to the financial institutions, 
“[t]he regulatory choice of new norms at this level of crisis response result-
ed in a new role for government as a coercive owner of property that had 
previously been perceived as inaccessibly private.”250  The concurrent deci-
sions to be flexible with regard to the property of banks, but not with regard 
to that of homeowners, demonstrates how the decision not to intervene on 
behalf of the homeowners was more complex than one based on an assump-
tion of a limited government role in “private” property.  We must consider 
in whose property the government took a role and whose was left alone. 
David Dana argues that the post-Kelo reform movement, wherein 
states enacted regulations that limited takings of private property for eco-
nomic development purposes, “privilege[d] the stability of middle-class 
households relative to the stability of poor households and, in so doing, ex-
presse[d] the view that the interests and needs of poor households are rela-
tively unimportant.”251  We can substitute “middle-class households” with 
“investment banks” and apply this argument to the Foreclosure Crisis.  The 
expressive power of privileging certain interests was at work again, and this 
time it meant saving the troubled investment banks through a willingness to 
be flexible with regard to ideas of banks’ property (as articulated by Da-
vidson and Dyal-Chand), but not with regard to that of troubled homeown-
ers.
252
  This sent a clear message as to whose interests and needs were a pri-
ority. 
Dana argues that this privileging does not in itself mean that these re-
forms should be undone, but rather that “[t]he expressive cost of the re-
form—the devaluation of the poor in legal and political discourse—might 
be outweighed by whatever non-expressive benefits the reform produces,” 
and that that burden to prove otherwise should be placed on the proponents 
                                                          
 249.  Id.  Davidson and Dyal-Chand also state that with regard to the method of bailout for the 
financial institutions, “[e]ven the limited equity ownership taken by the federal government is, in 
contemporary American terms, a relatively radical move.”  Id. at 1651.  The rationale behind why 
the government was willing to take these on as bad assets, rather than help transform the bad as-
sets into good ones, is not clear. 
 250.  Id. at 1645.  
 251.  David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor After Kelo, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 365, 365 (2007).  Dana’s full argument, for the interest of the reader, is that 
regulations privileged these interests by orienting eminent domain to condemnations of poor, 
blighted areas rather than middle-class areas.  Id. at 365–67.  He also acknowledges the population 
that was most condemned by foreclosures, stating that “[a]t its crudest, the message of the differ-
ential treatment of poor households and middle-class households is that staying in your home only 
really matters if you are a middle-class person in a middle-class home.”  Id. at 380. 
 252.  Davidson & Dyal-Chand, supra note 13, at 1639–41. 
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of the reform.
253
  In the case of the Foreclosure Crisis, the investment ter-
minology and the blame game narrowed the frameworks in which decisions 
were made, the effect being that much discourse focused on choosing be-
tween the homeowners and the banks.  Applying Dana’s argument here, the 
expressive power of blaming (and condemning) the low-income and mi-
nority homeowners should have been considered to a greater extent, and 
opponents to providing aid to this group should have borne the burden to 
justify the withholding of aid.
254
  This would have flipped the presumption 
under which discourse appeared to be operating, wherein those in favor of 
aiding homeowners had to defend such position vigorously but too little 
avail.
255
 
Finally, intervention of this kind by the government is not unheard of.  
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss in detail, but it is worth not-
ing that in the 1930s, during the Great Depression, many state governments 
issued moratoria on foreclosures after encouragement of re-negotiation of 
loan terms did not work.
256
 
D.  The Need for a New Model 
The Castle Model, propagated for decades, had its own problems, but 
it should not have been jettisoned without safety nets or notice.
257
  The 
Commodity Model appears to be even more problematic for property rights.  
This model does not take into account other factors—government propa-
ganda, the desire to be a legitimate part of a community or church, purpose-
ful misrepresentation of accounting—that may have played a role in a deci-
sion to invest in buying a house.  Rather, it judges a responsible investment 
decision based on the barest criteria of how one might judge an investor—
that is, based almost entirely on whether market value increased—and de-
termines from that what arrangements are not, and should not, be kept.
258
 
                                                          
 253.  Dana, supra note 251, at 366. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  This line of arguments puts us within Radin’s approach of privileged homes, as well.  See 
Barros, supra note 194, at 277–82 (discussing two ways of privileging the home). 
 256.  Shalendra D. Sharma, A Political Economy of the U.S. Subprime Meltdown, 39 ECON. 
ANALYSIS & POL’Y 171, 171 (2009); David C. Wheelock, Changing the Rules: State Mortgage 
Foreclosure Moratoria During the Great Depression, 90 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 569, 
573–74 (2008). 
 257.  See Singer, supra note 19, at 326–30 (“The castle model suggests that property includes 
certain core entitlements that cannot be taken or infringed without compensation, regardless of the 
public interests involved.”). 
 258.  Id. at 330–32. 
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When policy solutions were framed, the economic terms of this model 
further supported the idea that the bailout of investment banks would be a 
safer bet for the taxpayer than preventing failing mortgages.
259
  The solu-
tions did not have to be mutually exclusive.  Whether to provide bank 
bailouts must be analyzed separately from the issue of aiding homeowners.  
As it stands, the solution of the core issues of the Crisis is focused on the 
banks and the financial system (even if one is dissatisfied with the banks) 
rather than the homebuyer.  How do we reframe the choices we face so that 
we can move forward with effective housing policy?  We need a revised 
model of property regime to inform housing policy, particularly a more 
flexible one. 
III.  INCORPORATING INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTEXT INTO A MODEL 
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: BALTIMORE AS AN EXAMPLE 
This Article is not an attempt to articulate an entire alternate model of 
a property regime.  Instead, it adds two additional modes to analyzing prop-
erty—the interconnected nature and the context of property—to the grow-
ing body of scholarship that attempts to offer social or public interest nor-
mative content to the crafting of a property regime.
260
  Both of these modes 
of thinking of property might have lurked in the background when the Cas-
tle Model was primarily driving housing policy (through “castles for every-
one,” for example), but were basically left out of the Commodity Model.261  
As explored in this Part, “interconnectedness” draws on Joseph Singer’s 
work and modifies it based on Baltimore’s experience during the Foreclo-
sure Crisis; “context” takes a wider view of the purchase and ownership of 
houses.  In the case of the Foreclosure Crisis, this analysis entails acknowl-
edgment of the social context of the decision to own a house, the legal his-
tory of home-ownership (especially as applied in that geography), and the 
negotiations surrounding the investment and contract. 
A.  The Interconnected Nature of Property—Beyond Castles 
Singer acknowledges that the rules in our property system reflect mor-
al choices and that we must consider the form of social life we support in 
                                                          
 259.  Wiseman, supra note 48. 
 260.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 261.  See supra Part II.A.  This is ironic because subprime mortgages were put into CDOs and 
were insured by CDSs, thus the interconnectedness of modern investments should have been ob-
vious, though the physical property aspects of this are often ignored.  
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the law’s formulation.262  His “social relations” approach to property, in 
turn, is based on Martha Minow’s articulation of a more general “social re-
lations approach [that] assumes that there is a basic connectedness between 
people, instead of assuming that autonomy is the prior and essential dimen-
sion of personhood.”263  This social relations approach to property offers an 
alternative to the Castle Model that “suppresses the ways in which one cas-
tle can be used to invade another,” meaning that it oversimplifies the exist-
ence of borders between properties.
264
  In subsequent formulations, Singer 
referred to this alternate model as the “the good neighbor or environmental 
conception of property,” wherein property rights are “socially situated” and 
overlap with each other.
265
  This conception recognizes that the “use of 
one’s land often affects the legitimate interests of neighbors (and thus may 
be limited to the extent necessary to protect those legitimate interests),” and 
also emphasizes (perhaps more so than the Castle Model does) that 
“[p]hysical borders between owners may define the space within which 
owners are presumptively free to act but those borders do not define the 
scope of the owner’s freedom—nor of the owner’s property rights.”266  In 
the various versions of his alternate conception, Singer also acknowledges 
that “owners have obligations as well as rights” and that protection of socie-
ty as a whole (or recognition of the systemic effects of property rights) 
should be a purpose of a property rights regime.
267
 
I focus on the “interconnected” nature of property rather than the “so-
cial relations” nature in order to include some “non-social” costs, such as 
the physical effects to the land and the monetary costs borne by multiple ac-
tors.  This Article attempts to add to the normative aspect of social obliga-
tions that Joseph Singer and Gregory Alexander discuss by offering an ad-
ditional way of seeing property as a regime of interests, rights, and 
obligations rather than (merely) as an allocation of rights. 
1.  Interconnectedness and Baltimore 
The deterioration of Baltimore’s residential property shows how the 
physical boundaries and freedom within borders idea from the Castle Model 
                                                          
 262.  See Singer, supra note 9, at 334 (acknowledging that “the government response will inev-
itably shape social life”). 
 263.  Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retard-
ed, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 112, 127 
(1987).   
 264.  Singer, supra note 19, at 317–18.  
 265.  Singer, supra note 7, at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Id. 
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did not play out in the case of foreclosures. This point is brought home by 
Baltimore’s case against Wells Fargo.268 
In January of 2008, Mayor Sheila Dixon, Baltimore’s first African 
American female mayor, joined by the Baltimore City Council, sued Wells 
Fargo.
269
  In Mayor Dixon’s press release, her office emphasizes the racial 
aspects of predatory lending by Wells Fargo and the costs to the city: 
 Wells Fargo has one of the highest rates of foreclosure of any 
lender in Baltimore, and its foreclosure rate in majority African 
American neighborhoods is four times the rate in majority white 
neighborhoods, and twice the City average. 
 The lawsuit alleges that Wells Fargo is one of the leading caus-
es of the disproportionately high rate of foreclosures in these 
neighborhoods.  Specifically, the suit alleges that Wells Fargo has 
caused these foreclosures by targeting Baltimore’s African Amer-
ican neighborhoods for irresponsible and abusive subprime lend-
ing practices designed to maximize short term profits for the 
Bank. 
. . . . 
 These practices have resulted in an epidemic of foreclosures in 
Baltimore’s most vulnerable minority neighborhoods, which in 
turn have cost the City millions of dollars in damages.
270
 
Baltimore sued for violations of the FHA based on predatory lending 
practices and damages to the city as a result of foreclosures that Wells Far-
go knew or should have known would result from their lending practices.
271
 
By bringing this lawsuit, Baltimore went out on a limb as the first mu-
nicipality to sue a bank as a result of the Foreclosure Crisis.
272
  Since their 
initial suit, others have followed.
273
 
                                                          
 268.  Press Release, City of Baltimore, Baltimore Files First Lawsuit in Nation Seeking to Re-
cover Costs for Injury to City Caused by Racially Discriminatory Lending Practices Resulting in 
Epidemic of Foreclosures in the City’s Minority Neighborhoods (Jan. 8, 2008), available at 
http://docs.noodls.com/viewDoc.asp?filename=97700%5CEXT%5C20080108021001987606611
5.pdf. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id.  The use of certain words—caused, irresponsible, abusive, profit, costs, vulnerable—
speak volumes about this attempt to change the nature of the dialogue from the mainstream blam-
ing of victims.  Id. 
 271.  Id.  The first time the city went to court, the judge dismissed its complaint with instruc-
tions.  Brendan Kearney, Baltimore Can Proceed with Suit Against Wells Fargo, MARYLAND 
DAILY RECORD, Apr. 25, 2011, available at http://thedailyrecord.com/wp-content/plugins/tdc-
sociable-toolbar/wp-print.php?p=197352.  The second time, it was dismissed with clear instruc-
tions on how to show causation.  Id.  When the city filed its third amended complaint, the judge 
found Baltimore’s legal arguments plausible.  Id.   
 272.  John P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of the Fair Housing Act, 49 
IND. L. REV. 629, 630–32 (2008) (“For the first time, America’s cities—mayors and their city 
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In its Third Amended Complaint, Baltimore laid out the negative phys-
ical effects that foreclosures have had on the city.  These effects include in-
creased crime, vermin, unkempt yards, garbage, increased maintenance re-
quirements, fire responses, and eyesores.
274
  These effects clearly transgress 
any borders one might think define a parcel of property.  The physical 
neighbors suffer from the crime, animal life, garbage, and decreased proper-
ty values.
275
  The city claims that it has seen its costs go up as much as 
$34,199 per property.
276
  The banks suffer as well. 
Baltimore’s situation also demonstrates that communities are affected 
by foreclosures in a way that goes beyond the physical.  When communities 
are broken up because their members are forced to move and vacant lots 
then take their place it affects the social fabric of the entire area.  If people 
start to feel unsafe, insecure (tenure-wise), or otherwise disconnected from 
their homes and communities, the community itself has lost more than what 
is monetarily measurable.
277
 
In addition, Baltimore demonstrates the interconnected nature of prop-
erty through the various actors who bear the (interconnected) costs associat-
ed with the loss of property through foreclosures.  When houses are empty, 
there is decreased tax revenue, decreased property values, and an increase 
in costs to the city for maintenance, fire response, crime control, and pest 
control, among other costs.
278
  In Baltimore, this has resulted in a difficulty 
in neighborhood conditions, selling houses, and lower property values.
279
 
                                                          
councils—have begun to recognize the power of the FHA to bring irresponsible financial institu-
tions, the very ones who have profited at the expense of inner city black and Latino communities, 
to the table to remedy the injury that the cities have suffered.”). 
 273.  Andrew Martin, Judge Allows Redlining Suits to Proceed, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2011, at 
B9. 
 274.  Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 45–46, 
Mayor of City of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 
2010) (No. 1:08-cv-00062-JFM) [hereinafter Third Amended Complaint]. 
 275.  Singer, supra note 19, at 337. 
 276.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 45–46. 
 277.  See Brescia, supra note 205, at 168–70 (describing the various consequences on the 
community of extensive foreclosures). 
 278.  The Foreclosure Crisis: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 
112th Cong. 44 (2011) (statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Cong. Rep. of Md.).  A Johns 
Hopkins University report discusses the effects of foreclosures on Baltimore:  
Altogether, foreclosures cost Baltimore families more than $1.5 billion between 2008 
and 2010; the average family lost almost $150,000.  In 2010 alone, we estimate that the 
city lost $13.6 million in property taxes.  This figure is almost certainly an underesti-
mate of the total loss to the city, because it does not take into account the negative im-
pact that proximity to a foreclosed house has on property values of other homes in the 
neighborhood.  
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In July, 2012, the federal government settled multiple claims against 
Wells Fargo, which effectively ended Baltimore’s pending case.280  Balti-
more’s case would not have been an easy one to win.  In order to prove 
standing, its arguments rested on what some consider a precarious form of 
causation.  The threshold question is: Can a municipality sue a lender for 
the harms done to it through “private” lending to city residents?   
If the court had chosen to apply the Commodity Model strictly, then 
the answer is probably not, as the corners of the contract would define the 
parties who had standing.  If, however, the court took a wider view that the 
boundaries of property are not so clearly drawn, and acknowledged that 
lending to the residents affected the city, then maybe Baltimore would have 
had a chance.  (Wells Fargo must have thought that Baltimore stood enough 
of a chance to warrant their settlement.)  Baltimore provided evidence into 
the causes of default, including predatory lending practices, and added 
complexity to the simple story told by an investment gone wrong.
281
  The 
case, however, rested on the view that the very nature of property was much 
more than its physical borders and its use as an investment or a contract. 
While we can be sympathetic to their claims, we should also be mind-
ful that suing on behalf of Baltimore City may or may not have directly 
helped the homeowners who struggled through foreclosure.  Yet, regardless 
of the settlement, its approach provides a good example of the interconnect-
ed view of property in action.  More generally, this approach treats houses 
as much more than castles, investments, or contracts. 
The Castle Model prizes dominion over borders, but those borders are 
slippery things, as exemplified by Baltimore.  Physical harms, costs, and 
community effects do not appear to respect the borders drawn by owners of 
properties.  Where should borders be drawn?  Around houses? Around 
communities?  Baltimore’s example challenges the notion that it is produc-
tive to draw borders at all in relation to housing. 
                                                          
PETER ROSENBLATT & KATHERINE NEWMAN, KRIEGER SCHOOL OF THE ARTS AND SCIENCES, 
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., THE IMPACT OF FORECLOSURE WAVES ON THE CITY OF BALTIMORE 1  
(2011). 
 279.  See Brescia, supra note 205, at 169 (“One study that estimated the impact of foreclosures 
in the City of Chicago in the late 1990s showed that single-family homes within one eighth of a 
mile of a foreclosed home were reduced from between 0.9% and 1.136% per foreclosure. . . .  Re-
cent studies predict a range of losses to homeowners across the country due to the current rise in 
foreclosures from between $356 billion to $1.2 trillion in home values nationally.”).  
 280.  Wells Fargo Settlement: A Predatory Lender Pays Up, BALT. SUN, Jul. 15, 2012, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-07-15/news/bs-ed-wells-fargo-20120715_1_subprime-
mortgages-minority-borrowers-mortgage-brokers. 
 281.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 45–46. 
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With the Commodity Model, the kinds of effects mentioned above are 
not acknowledged, and accountability is not placed on any actors beyond 
the investor.  From this view of accountability, narrow solutions were based 
on saving the banks, and neighbors and city taxpayers ended up paying for 
the Crisis as shown by the Baltimore example.  Here, regardless of the out-
come, Baltimore has shown an alternative way of accounting for the Cri-
sis—how the banks are accountable and how to hold them accountable for 
some of the negative effects and costs. 
What would the recognition of interconnectedness into a property re-
gime mean?
282
  It would mean that the design of property would come from 
a place that does not only prize individual ownership and boundaries, but 
also places current exogenous characteristics of the use of property rights 
into the language of the property regime itself.  It would look at the pur-
chase of a house not just as a transaction between borrower and lender, but 
rather as the entrance of that person into that community municipality, in-
cluding the costs, obligations, rights, and social effects that come with it.  
Through this, the owner, the previous owner, the neighbors, the residents, 
the lender, and the city itself are recognized as players with stakes in the 
game. 
B.  Context of Property in Houses 
We have seen how the context of the purchase of a house and the de-
fault of a mortgage is significant in terms of the nonfungible nature of the 
house.  With regard to housing policy and the Foreclosure Crisis, the con-
text of the defaults, the legal historical context of housing and lending pat-
terns, and the context of entry into the investment and contract are material 
aspects of property that should drive housing policy.
283
  A look at the con-
text: (1) respects the house-buyer as a human agent with expectations and 
hopes that are more complex than those of the stripped away rational inves-
tor; (2) recognizes the government and private entity role in creating the sit-
uation that led to the Foreclosure Crisis; and (3) helps show the complex 
causation that could drive more intricate and effective solutions than the 
ones previously offered. 
                                                          
 282.  With respect to the financial institutions, Davidson and Dyal-Chand argued that: “[I]n an 
extraordinary inversion of prevailing property norms, property ownership served briefly as a locus 
for efforts to achieve stability, more in the nature of a safety net than a risk enabler, within the free 
market.”  Davidson & Dyal-Chand, supra note 13, at 1653.  This observation, unfortunately, does 
not apply to the treatment of homeowners (yet). 
 283.  See supra Part II. 
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This type of inquiry expands the view of the investment beyond the 
four corners of the contract and the rationality of the investor in a monetary 
instrument.  In the case of the investment, the view is expanded to include: 
what prompted one to enter into it; upon what information the investment 
was made; what incentives were offered, and by whom; who won and lost; 
and what was won and lost.  In the case of the contract, it looks beyond 
what is written or whom the two parties are (the government is not a party), 
how the contract came about, what each party knew, and to what each party 
agreed, among other factors. 
An approach to policy formulation that includes context would not 
start the analysis at the point of investment or other deductive metrics as de-
scribed in Part III.  Instead, it would look at the situation from the point of 
multiple actors.  From the point of homeowners, the complex causation of 
defaults might be uncovered through an empathetic
284
 inquiry into how it 
feels to heed the government and banks’ encouragement to borrow, to be 
proud of the achievement of homeownership and the American Dream, only 
to then lose the home and the Dream.  An inquiry of this kind would move 
away from the simplistic policy decisions that treat the symptoms of the 
problem without addressing the underlying reasons for the problems.  In 
other words, this kind of inquiry would, for example, move away from 
framing the decision as one to “save” a number of home-buyers based on a 
the simple assumption that they borrowed too much for their houses.  The 
approach used by the federal government, however, rested on a number of 
assumptions regarding responsibility, availability of information, and the 
government’s role as rescuer, all of which a contextual approach revisits.285 
When policymakers empathize and research the context of housing and 
default, they are more likely to design responsive and effective systems of 
regulation and law.  The rest of this Section explores what kind of housing 
policy results from using a contextual approach by looking at Baltimore in 
particular: first I analyze the social and legal historical context of buying a 
                                                          
 284.  See West, supra note 223. 
 285.  From the banks’ points of view, this might mean unpacking the difference between 
commercial and investment banks, if one wanted to empathize with an institution and not the peo-
ple that make it up.  Unfortunately, a full analysis of empathizing with the institution of an in-
vestment bank is beyond this Article, which is not to dismiss its importance.  The intense pres-
sures placed on overworked (lower level) employees to find investments for the influx of capital 
and the tight timelines that often lead to poor due diligence of commercial banks would also be a 
fascinating study.  
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house; second, I explore the investment and mortgage contractual
286
 natures 
of buying a house. 
1. The Historical Social and Legal Context of Defaults in Baltimore 
In 1910, Baltimore’s City Council passed the nation’s first racial zon-
ing ordinance.
287
 This law divided the city, block by block, into the black 
and white neighborhoods that, in part, still exist today.
288
  This ordinance 
provided a model that was later emulated by many cities across the southern 
United States, including Richmond, Norfolk, and Roanoke, Virginia; Win-
ston-Salem, North Carolina; Greenville, South Carolina; Birmingham, Ala-
bama; Atlanta, Georgia; and New Orleans, Louisiana.
289
 
The City of Baltimore did not act alone in supporting segregation.  The 
history of federal government involvement in segregation in Baltimore is 
well detailed in the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land’s opinion of Thompson v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment.
290
  In that case, the Maryland ACLU, as part of a class action, 
sued, inter alia, HUD and the Mayor and the City Council of Baltimore for 
violating the Fair Housing Act of 1968 by racially discriminating against 
blacks with regard to public housing and for violating the United States 
Constitution by failing “to take required action to ameliorate the effects of 
past race based discrimination in regard to public housing.”291  The Mary-
land ACLU alleged that these violations were manifested by “unfair[] con-
                                                          
 286.  I am not discussing the sales contract as the policy discourse did not appear to take this 
into account.  
 287.  Plaintiff’s Ex. 616 at 4, Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 
398 (D. Md. 2005) (No. CIV.A.MJG-95-304) (used with permission of the University of Balti-
more) [hereinafter Hirsch Report] (stating “having used the private real estate market to achieve a 
significant degree of racial separation, Baltimore’s whites already had evidence that government 
power and assistance were more supportive than subversive in their quest for ever more separa-
tion”); Baltimore Tries Drastic Plan of Race Segregation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1910, 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B03E7DF1630E333A25756C2A9649D94 
6196D6CF; Antero Pietila, History of Baltimore’s Racial Segregation Includes a Hard Look at 
Newspapers’ Role, BALT. BREW (Mar. 15, 2010, 6:26 AM), 
http://www.baltimorebrew.com/2010/03/15/history-of-baltimores-racial-segregation-includes-a-
hard-look-at-newspapers-role/. 
 288.  Id.; BARBARA SAMUELS, THE 1968 RIOTS AND THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC HOUSING 
SEGREGATION IN BALTIMORE, ACLU OF MARYLAND (2008), available at 
http://www.prrac.org/pdf/riots_and_rebirth.pdf.  See generally ANTERO PIETILA, NOT IN MY 
NEIGHBORHOOD: HOW BIGOTRY SHAPED A GREAT AMERICAN CITY (2010) (exploring how dis-
crimination toward blacks and Jews has shaped today’s cities, including Baltimore).  
 289.  Pietila, supra note 287, at 23. 
 290.  348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. 2005). 
 291.  Id. at 407. 
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centrat[ions of] African-American public housing residents in the most im-
poverished, segregated areas of Baltimore City.”292  The Court found HUD 
liable for racially segregated public housing and for failing to offer the op-
portunity for low-income blacks to live in integrated parts of Baltimore:
293
 
Far from fulfilling HUD’s constitutional obligations to disestab-
lish the vestiges of past intentional segregation and its statutory 
obligation to affirmatively further fair housing, ‘not a penny’ of 
the billions of dollars spent by HUD in the Baltimore region has 
gone to help African-American public housing residents move to 
integrated neighborhoods.
294
 
While I use this quote to highlight the federal government’s involvement in 
segregation and unequal housing opportunities, it is also worth noting two 
other aspects of this case—Baltimore City was not held liable, and the court 
was directly addressing the public-private cooperation in housing.
295
 
Despite the repeal of the segregation ordinances and the passage of the 
FHA, racial separation has persisted in Baltimore.
296
  This segregation di-
rectly led to the disastrous consequences seen today as a result of predatory 
lending and foreclosures. 
Those practices of segregation and separation made what is now called 
“reverse redlining” possible.  “Redlining” refers to lending practices where 
banks demarcated areas, sometimes by literally drawing a red line on maps 
where blacks and other minorities lived, in order to exclude them from 
credit.
297
  “Reverse redlining,” as it is now called, refers to the practice of 
quite the opposite—demarcating areas where blacks and other minorities 
live in order to target them for loans with unfavorable terms.
298
  A city like 
                                                          
 292.  Case: Thompson v. HUD, NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, 
http://naacpldf.org/case-issue/thompson-v-hud (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). 
 293.  As for the City of Baltimore, they were not held liable primarily due to lack of discrimi-
natory purpose and intent during the relevant period, and because of some apparently good faith 
efforts to rectify the past discrimination.  Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 408.  Note that Balti-
more’s government has gone from Defendant to Plaintiff in the matter of fair housing in just a few 
years.  See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 294.  Case: Thompson v. HUD, supra note 292.  
 295.  Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 408.  This further highlights the issues raised in Part I re-
garding the promotion of homeownership and the public/ private nature of housing.  “In sum, the 
line . . . between private and public action was, by the time work began under Titles I and III of 
the 1949 Housing Act, blurred and, at times, nearly erased.”  Hirsh Report, supra note 287.   
 296.  Pietila, supra note 288.  
 297.  Brescia, supra note 279, at 179. 
 298.  Id. 
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Baltimore, where minorities already lived separately, made it all the easier 
to target them for such loans.
299
 
When these loans began unraveling in the mid 2000s and Baltimore 
began to suffer from massive foreclosures,
300
 these foreclosures and aban-
doned houses were largely concentrated in mixed race and black neighbor-
hoods.
301
 
Regardless of the outcome of Baltimore’s case against Wells Fargo, 
the case is revealing regarding the context of the foreclosures—both for the 
substance of the complaint and supporting documents and for its analysis of 
Baltimore more generally. 
Affidavits from former Wells Fargo loan officers detail the ongoing 
treatment of blacks and other minorities in Baltimore.  Elizabeth Jacobsen, 
a former Wells Fargo loan officer, discussed how she made more than 
$700,000 in commission in 2004, and $550,000 in commissions and pay in 
2005.
302
  She also explained Wells Fargo’s targeting of black communities, 
including churches, through “wealth seminars” and the use of black loan of-
ficers to market these events.
303
  In particular, Wells Fargo had a program 
where it would donate $350 to a nonprofit of the borrower’s choice if the 
borrower took out a loan; Wells Fargo then tried to sell church leaders on 
                                                          
 299.  Relman, supra note 272, at 629–37 (discussing how the “legacy of discrimination [segre-
gation] . . . has left underserved minority communities particularly vulnerable to the predatory 
practices of subprime lenders and the devastating consequences of foreclosure that follow close on 
the forced abandonment of countless homes . . . [and how] reverse redlining arises in cities where 
there are racially segregated residential living patterns. This means that the people who are most 
vulnerable to abusive lending practices are geographically concentrated and therefore easily tar-
geted by lenders”).   
 300.  Researchers from Johns Hopkins recently estimated that there were 18,000 foreclosures 
in Baltimore from 2007–2010.  ROSENBLATT & NEWMAN, supra note 278, at 4.  The plaintiff’s 
lawyer in Baltimore’s case against Wells Fargo estimated that there were more than 33,000 from 
2000–2008.  Relman, supra note 272, at 632.  In 2009, there were 16,400 (or 8 out every 100) va-
cant or abandoned homes listed in the City of Baltimore.  THE BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOOD 
INDICATORS ALLIANCE, JACOB FRANCE INST., HOUS. AND CMTY. DEV., VITAL SIGNS 9, at 2 
(2010), available at http://bniajfi.org/uploaded_files/0000/0756/vs_9_housing.pdf.  Broken down 
to the neighborhood levels, in eight out of the fifty-five statistical areas in Baltimore, at least one 
in five houses were empty.  Id. at 6. 
 301.  ROSENBLATT & NEWMAN, supra note 278, at 4.  (“Poorer, mixed race neighborhoods 
had a higher incidence of foreclosure than well-off majority white neighborhoods.  The average 
white neighborhood had 44 foreclosures, less than 4% of its occupied housing stock.  The average 
mixed race neighborhood had 68 foreclosures, more than 6% of its occupied housing stock.  Ma-
jority black neighborhoods were more like mixed race neighborhoods, with 5.4 % of their houses 
foreclosed.”).   
 302.  Jacobsen Affidavit at 6, Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 
847 (D. Md. 2010) (No. JFM 1:08 CV–00062).  
 303.  Id. at 29.  
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this program.
304
  Jacobsen also discussed how Wells Fargo loan officers 
purposely steered people eligible for prime loans (with better interest rates) 
to subprime loans, how Wells Fargo left massive discretion to the loan of-
ficers to determine the amount of fees they would charge,
305
 and how offic-
ers misled people into thinking that the terms of their loans, specifically the 
2/28 loans with teaser rates for two years, were more favorable for the loan 
officers to get the commissions.
306
 
Anthony Paschal, another former Wells Fargo loan officer, is more to 
the point regarding the role of race in lending: “[Wells Fargo employees] 
referred to subprime loans made in minority communities as ‘ghetto loans’ 
and minority customers as ‘those people [who] have bad credit,’ and ‘those 
people [who] don’t pay their bills,’ and ‘mud people.’”307  He also dis-
cussed that Wells Fargo targeted black neighborhoods, avoided a predomi-
nantly white county because it was not favorable for selling subprime loans, 
and discriminated against minority employees within Wells Fargo.
308
 
Race, discrimination, misrepresentation, and fraud—once again, treat-
ing house buyers in Baltimore as merely investors—barely scratches the 
surface of the underlying problems and does little to address the reality of 
what transpired or what is necessary to prevent similar situations.  Revisit-
ing Baltimore shows the disparity at this step, however.  The city had its 
own interests in suing Wells Fargo over the foreclosures.  If Baltimore’s 
lawsuit had been successful, they would have gained something—but it is 
unclear if this would have benefitted the former homeowners directly, or 
just the taxpayers (and therefore the former homeowners indirectly).  Also, 
the local government set up segregation, redlining, and the other circum-
stances that made reverse redlining possible, and it did little to proactively 
change conditions.
309
  Even so, Baltimore claimed damages related to only 
190 properties.  Nonetheless, their perseverance and investigations may 
have catalyzed support for homeowners in other ways. 
                                                          
 304.  Id. at 27.  
 305.  Id. at 24.  
 306.  Id. at 12, 13, 15–17.   
 307.  Paschal Aff. at 8, Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 
(D. Md. 2010) (No. JFM 1:08 CV–00062).  
 308.  Id.  
 309.  See supra notes 287–288 and 295–297 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Using Interconnectedness and Context to Inform Investment and 
Contract 
Baltimore exemplifies the community destruction that resulted from 
the Crisis.  Considering the models, if the house were truly fungible, then it 
would not matter to neighbors, schools, and the city if the banks owned it 
(assuming that the banks kept it in good shape).  Baltimore’s experience, 
however, shows not only that residences are not fungible, but also that los-
ing the investment in a house has social and communal costs that normal 
investment do not—including impacts on schools, communities, and public 
health and safety.  Treating the house merely as an investment narrowly fo-
cuses on the problems and loses sight of these other effects. 
Baltimore also demonstrates just how unjust these deserts were.
310
  
This Article focuses on property rights, so I do not explore suggestions to 
increase disclosure requirements or homebuyer protection.  But, I would 
like to note that as a responsible investor, one would also be expected to 
perform due diligence, which in this case could hardly be done.
311
 Material 
information was clearly kept from borrowers for the benefit and commis-
sion of loan officers.
312
 Though one should know the terms of one’s loan, as 
explained in Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
this is not as straightforward as it sounds.
313
  Besides, despite being given 
calculations and research into neighboring property values, even “sophisti-
cated” investors did not foresee the kind of bubble burst that occurred. 
Taking the wider context of the effects of foreclosures and Baltimore’s 
experience into account shows just how inefficient this debacle was, and 
how “efficiency” can be a poor metric by which to make policy.  As dis-
cussed, not only did the value of security (the houses’ values) decrease, but 
looking at Baltimore, it is clear that taxpayers foot the bill of this debacle by 
dealing with decreased tax revenue and increased costs from nearby fore-
closures.
314
 
Efficiency as a value in policymaking needs to be balanced with social 
context, as explained above.  This would translate into including a broader 
spectrum of costs or unquantifiable drawbacks, which policies might trig-
ger.  In the context of the Foreclosure Crisis, this would include the troubles 
                                                          
 310.  See supra notes 302–306 and accompanying text. 
 311.  For an analysis of the role of realtors as unofficial and problematic experts, see Brent 
White, supra note 77.   
 312.  Third Amended Complaint, supra note 274. 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  Complaint at 35, Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 
(D. Md. Jan. 8, 2008) (No. JFM 1:08 CV–00062). 
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that resulted for many different actors—troubles such as personal losses of 
the home, the breakup of neighborhoods, and effects on schools, education, 
jobs, and taxpayers. 
An alternative approach might explicitly value deliberation (over 
speed) with regard to property and housing.  Revisiting Elizabeth Jacob-
sen’s affidavit,315 one cannot help noting that perhaps Wells Fargo should 
have slowed down and taken time to properly value credit and sales, rather 
than value speed and more deals.  In this way, being less efficient in the 
short-run might have not only led to greater efficiency but also to greater 
social benefits of security of tenure in the long run. 
Although both property and contract law are supposed to increase lib-
erty, Baltimore demonstrates—looking beyond the four corners of the con-
tract—how liberty was not furthered by the contracts that were enforced 
during the Foreclosure Crisis. 
Treating contracts that relate to land (or houses) differently is not in-
imical to contract law principles.  As Gerald Korngold has noted, although 
“[a]s an overall guiding principle,” agreements between buyers and sellers 
are usually enforced on the “theory that this will maximize[] collective 
wealth[,] there is something different about land transactions compared to 
other property interests that requires special attention to land allocation 
agreements.”316  And special attention does exist; land is one of the few are-
as of contract law where a party suing for breach may ask for specific per-
formance as a remedy—real estate has not always been treated as fungi-
ble.
317
 
Korngold also acknowledges the temporal reach of ownership of sim-
ple goods, which will eventually decay, as compared to land, which lasts 
much longer in time and binds future owners (and perhaps neighbors) who 
are not party to current arrangements.
318
  I would add that not only future 
parties, but also many other entities including the community itself and the 
physical land, are bound by land dealings.  In short, while Korngold 
acknowledges that “[c]ontracts for goods rarely bind third parties, while 
contracts for realty in effect routinely do precisely that,” especially through 
degradation of the natural and ecological attributes of land,
319
 I believe his 
thesis could be pushed further to include more connections.  If the intercon-
nectedness with those ahead in time (owners and even neighbors) can be 
                                                          
 315.  Jacobsen Affidavit, supra note 302. 
 316.  Korngold, supra note 84, at 1528. 
 317.  Id.   
 318.  Id. at 1528–29. 
 319.  Id. at 1529.   
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acknowledged, then perhaps there is space to acknowledge other kinds of 
entities as well. Interconnectedness is not just about owners and physical 
neighbors, but also about the communities and the city—and as A.J. van der 
Walt would remind us, those on the margins of property.
320
 
Korngold also notes that “[land] continues to play a unique and critical 
economic, social, and political role in the United States.  Land is not just 
another asset in our experience, and future generations will need the ability 
to effectively utilize and manage this unique resource.”321  With that in 
mind, perhaps if we can expand the view as to the value of land and houses 
as including much more than their monetary value as commodities, then we 
can also expand effective “utilization.” 
IV.  SPECULATIONS ON THE WAY FORWARD FOR HOUSING POLICY 
While the primary goal of this Article is to widen the theoretical space 
for an interconnected and contextualized property regime, it is worth noting 
some policy choices that would flow from an alternative vision: the rethink-
ing of ownership and the modification of contracts. 
A.  Rethinking Ownership 
From a property regime that incorporates and acknowledges its own 
interconnected and contextual nature, the profound place that ownership has 
in housing policy can be re-evaluated. Perhaps it is not ownership that 
should be furthered at such expense, but rather the agency and dignity that 
come from having secure tenure in a home.
322
  While this might mean own-
ership, it should not necessarily be the case. The Foreclosure Crisis has 
shown how one size does not actually fit all and that alternative means to 
secure tenure could mean more secure housing for more people. 
In some ways, rethinking ownership should not be entirely conten-
tious, as the Foreclosure Crisis also seemed to highlight just how tenuous 
“ownership” is in today’s mortgage-backed American Dream.  A homebuy-
er with low equity in their house and who makes payments paycheck to 
paycheck, knowing that the bank can foreclose if his income dries up, hard-
                                                          
 320.  van der Walt, supra note 6, at 17–21; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 321.  Korngold, supra note 84, at 1529.  Although I agree with Korngold’s statement here, I 
disagree with his use of the phrase “effectively utilize and manage.” 
 322.  Adams, supra note 30, at 595 (“In responding to the way in which Americans have seen 
homeownership as the national ideal, Nathan Straus, former head of the United States Housing 
Authority, suggested that a different perspective may be more accurate: Under conditions of mod-
ern civilization, a man does not have to buy a cow because his family needs milk.  He should not 
have to buy a house because his family needs a home.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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ly constitutes the kind of “dominion” over one’s borders so celebrated in 
the Castle Model.
323
  The low equity hardly seems to constitute owning a 
house, as opposed to a claim to that amount should the bank foreclose.  In 
this way, the Foreclosure Crisis blew the idea of security of tenure out of 
the water without offering alternatives to the American Dream. 
Rethinking the methods by which people have access to homes might 
also involve expanded shared equity programs, which come in many differ-
ent forms.
324
  One form, what the Center for Housing Policy at Harvard 
calls the “publicly-funded shared-appreciation” model involves a public 
loan, subsidy or other form of equity extraction to a home buyer, who “then 
repays the subsidy or investment upon selling the home, along with some 
portion of appreciation.”325  During the Foreclosure Crisis, while some had 
suggested that these models could have been used in order to keep people in 
their homes,
326
 this idea was not widely implemented, probably because of 
the requirement of upfront public funds in the form of subsidies to home-
buyers facing foreclosure.  During this time, the loans or subsidies could 
have been used to make mortgage payments, as opposed to their usual use 
toward the down payment.  Again, the homebuyer could have paid off the 
loan upon sale of the house.  In the case of “underwater” homes, more re-
search needs to be done as to how the arrangement would work, but it has 
been suggested that perhaps the government could forgive part of the loan 
based on the resale value of the house.
327
 
Michael Diamond has argued that while shared equity “raises for some 
observers the specter of a less-than-full-ownership interest because the low 
income home buyer, as a condition of obtaining the financing to permit her 
to purchase the home, is required to share the equity with others, often fu-
ture generations of low income home buyers,”328 these fears are misguided 
                                                          
 323.  See supra Part I. 
 324.  Michael Diamond, Shared Equity Housing: Cultural Understanding and the Meaning of 
Ownership 15 (Geo. L. and Econ. Research Paper No. 11-22, 2011) (stating “[s]hared equity hous-
ing raises many . . . questions about the meaning of ownership and property rights”).  That is why 
this Article aims to set out certain parameters of property as a regime before tying that vision to 
shared equity as a housing policy.  
 325.  Sherriff & Lubell, supra note 161, at 7–8 (providing a helpful illustration of how this 
works mathematically). 
 326.  Id. at 10, 29. 
 327.  Id. at 10–11; see also id. at 13 (discussing public-private hybrid experiments).  Also, it is 
interesting to note that the United Kingdom and Australia have used these programs to some 
(mixed) success.  Id. at 15–16.  
 328.  See Diamond, supra note 324, at 16 (referring to shared subsidy programs, where the 
house price is directly subsidized and the buyer agrees not to sell above a certain price, so as to 
keep the house affordable to future buyers).  
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for two reasons.  First, the fears are based on an assumption that potential 
low-income home buyers are facing a choice between shared equity home-
ownership and non-shared equity homeownership (whereas their actual 
choice of living situations is usually quite different and involves renting not 
owning). Second, they are based on a definition of homeownership ground-
ed in classical western models of property rights (similar to the Castle 
Model I describe above) that do not reflect the reality of property in the 
United States today.
329
 With regard to the latter point, Diamond’s discus-
sion touches on the way in which this type of ownership raises questions 
about the nature of ownership and property, and how property itself is a 
“culturally specific constructed concept.”330  In an earlier piece, he explored 
the implications for shared equity on property theory and concluded that 
the resale restrictions placed on some subsidized homeowners are 
appropriate elements of public policy and are in keeping with a 
major strain of understanding in American legal and political 
thinking about the meaning of property . . . [and] are consistent 
with other restrictions currently placed on private property in or-
der to meet overriding public concerns.
331
 
In attempting my current project, I am not as sanguine about the ac-
ceptance of shared equity as consistent with either major strain in American 
legal and political thinking regarding property or the appropriate re-
strictions.  It strikes me that during the Foreclosure Crisis and the handling 
of it, these voices were silenced in favor of a model that turned away from 
flexibility and recognition of the extent to which private property is not ac-
tually based on Blackstonian notions of castle and separation.  With that in 
mind, while my project does not attempt to delve into the intricacies of 
shared equity programs as his does, it does attempt to further open up theo-
retical space with regard to property and ownership from which these and 
other alternate methods of structuring ownership in practice might flow. 
Reframing the issue in terms of tenure, not ownership, would also (fi-
nally) bring renters into the dialogue.  In 2009, late relief was passed for 
renters whose buildings were foreclosed upon through the Helping Families 
Save their Homes Act.
332
  This Act allows for tenants to stay in their rentals 
after foreclosure for ninety days or until their lease is finished.
333
  But 
renters’ needs could be addressed in more comprehensive ways through ex-
                                                          
 329.  Id. at 21.   
 330.  Id. 
 331.  Michael R. Diamond, The Meaning and Nature of Property: Homeownership and Shared 
Equity in the Context of Property, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 85, 88 (2009). 
 332.  Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2009). 
 333.  Id. 
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panding the focus on flexible forms of tenure.
334
 Such support might also 
include improved incentives to rent, such as allowing renters to enjoy the 
same kind of tax credits that mortgage holders do. These reforms might 
change the current situation where rental locations are often not desirable 
and are less legitimate than ownership.
335
 Renting today would also ac-
commodate the growing number of people who might find a new job that 
requires a move, something that became difficult when job growth contract-
ed and selling one’s house became harder.336  Slowly, perhaps the stigma 
around renting would change.
337
 Prior to World War II, many people rented, 
including the wealthy.
338
 
This focus on tenure might also open up space to have flexibility in 
other types of housing patterns.
339
 If policies are in fact meant to further dis-
tributional and egalitarian goals, then perhaps the focus should have been 
on creating choices for people regarding living situations based on the reali-
                                                          
 334.  See Amanda Erickson, How Can Renters Have More Control over Their Homes?, 
ATLANTIC CITIES, Nov. 18, 2011, http://www.theatlanticcities.com/housing/2011/11/how-can-
renters-have-more-control-over-their-homes/529/ (offering a discussion on renters, respect, and 
potential alternative arrangements). 
 335.  See Adams, supra note 30 at 609–13 (discussing how pro-homeownership policies may 
be anti-rental policies at their core, based on “some suggestion” that the FHA may have discour-
aged rentals in favor of ownership and the presence of the real estate lobby, which “has associated 
homeownership with stability and patriotism” and “politicians and homeownership advocates 
[who] have unfairly associated rental—and especially public housing—with socialism and the 
decline of free enterprise” and evidence of the amount of federal funds spent on homeownership 
support as compared to rental support); see also Kiviat, supra note 48, at 1 (“Homeownership con-
tributed to the hollowing out of cities and kept renters out of the best neighborhoods.”). 
 336.  See id. at 2 (stating “[b]eing free to move around the country easily means that people 
can go where the jobs are”). 
 337.  See id. at 4 (stating that “[i]n an ideal world, the way you pay for your shelter shouldn’t 
reflect your socioeconomic status.  In Switzerland, one of the world’s richest nations, two-thirds 
of all families rent.  Yet in the U[nited] S[tates], whether you own or rent says something about 
who you are—and often limits where you can live.”). 
 338.  See JACKSON, supra note 30. 
 339.  In her article, Kiviat focuses on the ongoing debate surrounding the restructuring of the 
housing financing system: “[T]here is this notion that being housed well is synonymous with be-
ing a homeowner,” says Raphael Bostic, Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Re-
search at HUD.  “That narrative has got to change.” Kiviat, supra note 48, at 1.  Kiviat also dis-
cusses how it seems ubiquitous not just in rhetoric but in law as well, stating:  
Harvard economist Glaeser has looked at how local governments, often spurred on by 
existing homeowners, restrict housing type.  Of the 186 towns and cities within 50 
miles (80 km) of Boston, 34 forbid multifamily dwellings such as townhouses and 
apartment buildings, and another 81 allow them on less than 10% of the available land. 
People who don’t buy stand-alone houses—for the most part, renters—are not wel-
come.  And that doesn’t just happen around Boston.  “In many parts of the country,” 
says Glaeser, “renters are zoned out.” 
Id. at 4. 
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ties of income. This would mean more creative low-cost housing
340
 or en-
couraging financial innovation with regard to progressive mortgage instru-
ments such as private shared equity arrangements.  Physically, re-thinking 
the Castle Model might change the kinds of homes that are available, or the 
limits to the kinds of separation that people think they can have. 
These policies would require thinking that goes beyond raising the bar 
on acceptable lending practices in order to prevent foreclosures. If such a 
bar is raised without flexible choices also being offered, it will likely end up 
with the kind of distributional disparities that were meant to be curbed in 
the first place. Moreover, the dream of ownership is so embedded in Amer-
ica that it cannot entirely be jettisoned. According to the Harvard Center for 
Housing Policy, “[d]espite a greater appreciation of the financial risks, pref-
erences for homeownership among renters remain strong.”341  Indeed, 
“[c]onsidering the fact that the most common reasons cited for buying 
homes are nonfinancial—including a good place to raise and educate chil-
dren, feelings of safety, and greater control over one’s living environment—
the continued appeal of homeownership is not surprising.”342 
B.  Beyond Defaults and Toward Wider Solutions 
When the financial crisis was at its worst, policy proposals and rheto-
ric often pitted saving mortgage holders against saving banks.
343
  Instead of 
framing the problem so narrowly as this unattractive mutually exclusive 
choice, an analysis recognizing the interconnected nature of property and 
the context of the foreclosures during the Crisis, opens up space for alterna-
tive solutions and policies.  If viewed through multiple lenses—federal 
housing policy, local communities, cities, investment and commercial 
banks, homebuyers, and investors—the Foreclosure Crisis shows how 
houses could be used to bolster citizen participation, tax bases, community 
life, investments, and homes, among other ends in and of themselves.  From 
this analysis, it is not as easy to pick and choose winners and losers because 
in many foreclosure situations actors, communities, and physical structures 
“lost.” 
Moreover, seeing homeowners in the context of their investments and 
contracts, as well as seeing the nature of the home, allows for homeowners 
who are unable to make loan payments to be seen as members of a commu-
                                                          
 340.  See Erickson, supra note 334 (listing a number of affordable options for renters to ac-
quire ownership); see also Sherriff & Lubell, supra note 161, at 7–18.  
 341.  STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING, supra note 164, at 18. 
 342.  Id. 
 343.  See supra Part I.  
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nity, as people with hopes, dreams, and attachments, and not just as default-
ers.  Once they are seen merely as defaulters, potential policy solutions are 
limited to ones that deal with nonperforming parties to a contract, rather 
than individuals attempting to achieve the American Dream.  And, solutions 
may go beyond contractual ones, which forces a decision as to whose prop-
erty is worth protecting—banks’ security interests or homeowners’ 
homes.
344
  In choosing the former, not only were the actors more valued 
(banks), but a certain kind of property and measurement of value (monetary 
terms) won the day. 
If respect for the contract was meant to respect the banks’ property 
rights that were created and the actual reason for the contract, it did not 
seem to accomplish either.  Yes, banks got title, but to what?  The contract 
was created for the purpose of creating property rights in the house as a se-
curity interest, but by focusing only on the words of the contract, while the 
security interest’s value was being decimated, no one won.345 
Contextualizing mortgage contracts and the decreasing value of the se-
curity interests held by the banks would make it possible to see loan modi-
fication not as abrogating expectations, but as respecting them.  During the 
Crisis, it seems that modification would “abrogate” contracts, and was 
therefore off the table of potential solutions for federal lawmakers, as ex-
plored above.
346
  That said, at least three examples show this view of the 
contract as immutable was the only way of seeing the investment and con-
tract.  First, as previously discussed, Davidson and Dyal-Chand have ex-
plored how the treatment of banks and equity holdings by the government 
turned traditional notions of property and public-private agreements on their 
head in order to preserve banks’ property.347  Similar flexibility in policy 
might have been applied in order to preserve overarching policy and legal 
values such as fairness and informed consent in the case of contracts. Sec-
ond, the federal government did step in and force modification in the case 
of certain General Motors contracts as part of their agreement to bail out the 
failing auto giant.
348
  Third, in August of 2011, the Massachusetts Attorney 
General settled a lawsuit with a subsidiary of H&R Block and required the 
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lender to make $115 million in loan modifications.
349
  The lender targeted 
minority borrowers for loans which they “knew were likely to fail,” and al-
so “gave its employees discretion to charge higher fees to such borrow-
ers.”350 Taken as a whole, these examples highlight the potential to be more 
flexible when viewing the contracts in context and from the point of view of 
multiple stakeholders. 
Moreover, these examples show the fallacy of the assumption that 
modification destroys businesses’ and investors’ confidences in the market. 
General Motors’s contracts were modified in a very public way,351 and de-
spite fears that investors would lose faith and the entirety of contract law 
would be called into question, the sky did not fall down.  Therefore, the jus-
tification of restoring business confidence in the context of contracts, or in 
the use of TARP funds,
352
 should not be accepted merely at face value.
353
 
Once we recognize the interconnectedness of property and also re-
sponsibility for foreclosures, the door opens for a different kind of cost al-
location. In Baltimore’s case, this means spreading the costs to the banks 
that precipitated them.
354
 
But even more generally, if the federal government had recognized its 
own complicity in its approach to regulation, perhaps the dialogue would 
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have been open for more creative policy solutions—more effective loan 
modifications, shared equity, or government guaranteeing of mortgages.  In 
order to conceive of these, as well as to make them politically possible, 
however, the dialogue has to shift from guilty homeowners who need to be 
saved to a focus on the deeper problem that requires complex solutions. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Foreclosure Crisis revealed the untenability of federal housing 
policy as informed by models of property that treated the house as a castle 
or merely as a commodity. Once we revise our rhetoric away from these ex-
tremes and toward an interconnected view of property and houses as being 
contextualized places of social values and uses, then we open up space to 
satisfy the underlying goals of housing (for example, having access to actu-
al housing) and contracts (markets that work based on genuine information) 
in ways that do not appear to be in as direct conflict as before.  This means 
that if we accept that we want housing for all, we may accept alternative 
forms of ownership and some government role in securing this goal. 
By taking for granted the initial situation as to how homeowners en-
tered into their mortgage agreement—without taking their situation, opin-
ion, and available resources into account—policies meant to stem the ef-
fects of the Foreclosure Crisis further vilified homeowners and avoided real 
improvements for them or for foreclosures overall.  By issuing policies in 
which the would-be achiever of the American Dream would get entangled, 
the federal government has a responsibility to act in a way that recognizes 
the full situation of homeowners and does not, in the face of crisis, simply 
abandon responsibility for the problems resulting from those policies. 
Contextualizing houses, investments, and contracts would analyze the 
Foreclosure Crisis as more than resulting from irresponsible borrowers or 
greedy banks, but as resulting from complex and heterogeneous causation, 
including: federal, state, and local government policies regarding home-
ownership and other social policies; homeowners and their position in soci-
ety with regard to their wealth, race, and other contexts; and commercial 
and investment banks, and mortgage brokers (in sum, the multiple contexts 
of the housing choices of individuals).  Contextualizing property based on 
this kind of analysis would also open up theoretical and policy space to 
craft a property regime with recognition of the interconnectedness of the in-
stitution and its direct effects on housing policy and, therefore, the Foreclo-
sure Crisis.  Finally, this mode of analysis makes possible solutions that re-
think the nature of ownership and implementation of the kinds of values 
that property regimes should further. 
